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
SOCIOLOGY

JOHN M. GILLETTE

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SOCIOLOGY

BY

John M. Gillette, Ph.D.

*Professor of Sociology in the University of North Dakota,
Author of "Vocational Education," "Constructive
Rural Sociology," and "The Family and Society"*



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EDITOR'S PREFACE

THERE are many books on Sociology; nearly all of them, however, rather ponderous tomes of forbidding aspect to the reader who approaches the subject for the first time. The application of scientific principles to social data has brought about a systematizing of material, and the development of a rough approximation to a science. This science is now called Sociology. To bring together the main features of this science in a small volume for the general reader is the purpose of the author. The book should open the way to a larger appreciation of what is going on in the study of social phenomena.

F. L. M.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THERE is some justification for a small volume on sociology which the public generally may read, and perhaps study clubs and secondary schools may use as a guide. I do not question the usefulness of such a book if organized and readable. When so many issues are placed before the public, and such diverse views as to appropriate collective action exist, there is a serious demand for a broader sociological knowledge which will steady the judgment and help decide questions on principle. The study of society as an evolution, the consideration of the constitution of societal life, and reflection upon the methods by which society is controlled and improved, should give a basis for the forming of judgments about what should be undertaken, and of a rational optimism as to the final realization of a better social order.

The popular conception of the nature of sociology is often hazy and requires information. Sociology is liable to be identified with slumming, charity and philanthropy, empty observations of public spectacles, socialism, and kindred phenomena. While all of these items may fur-

Author's Preface

nish data for sociological generalizations, a brief study of the subject of sociology will serve to distinguish it from any and all of them.

This book pretends to be merely an introduction to the study of sociology. There is nothing original in it except that it is the formulation and views of a teacher and student of the vast field of sociology. It was prepared to meet the demands of those who have some curiosity about the nature of society and sociology, but have not a great deal of time in which to satisfy it. Sufficient references accompany the various chapters to enable the reader and student to make a larger study of the subject, and it is hoped that this simple outline will not extinguish any wholesome craving for information, but may even whet the appetite for subsequent and more extensive investigations.

JOHN M. GILLETTE.

University of North Dakota.

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SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER I

THE SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY

WHILE this small volume does not purport to represent in an explicit manner the science of sociology, it does suggest that there may be such a science. As a consequence, some explanation should be made of what sociology treats and what its relation is to other sciences.

Sociology a Science

In saying that sociology is a science the term science is used in its ordinary sense. There are those who say that sociology is not a science. If by science is meant absolute exactitude and predictability, the charge is true. But the statement is equally applicable to most of the subjects that are now denominated sciences, for the element of exactitude and the basis of prediction are very small in all save astronomy and portions of physics and chemistry. With reference to the social science group, there are none in which the generalizations as a whole rest on a scientific

statistical basis so that accurate predictions as to the future relationships among their phenomena may be made. Only the somewhat elastic meaning of the term science—that it consists of a systematic body of knowledge from which tendencies in phenomena may be perceived—is applicable to most of the sciences and to the social sciences in particular. But such a body of knowledge is useful for directive purposes and it furnishes the foundation for a development toward a greater degree of exactitude. Such a body of knowledge is offered in sociology.

Development of Sociology

Sociology is one of the newer of the social sciences. As compared with the age of history and economics it is a mere youth. A few ideas which are of a sociological nature date from the time of Plato and Aristotle, but no general science of society was formulated before the time of August Comte and Herbert Spencer. Each of these men drew up a system of social philosophy to which was given the name of sociology. In the United States, Lester F. Ward was the first to develop an independent system of social philosophy.

The science of sociology has had a rapid growth in the United States and has become a regular part of the curriculum in most of the colleges and universities. In England, since the time

of Herbert Spencer, it has developed but little until recently, probably because Spencer demonstrated so effectually to Englishmen that while human intervention might greatly harm society it could do little toward its improvement. The science of economics as formulated by the Germans has been so largely of a general sociological nature that little need has been found for a sociology until recently. But during recent times German economists and other social scientists have insisted that a demand exists for such a science, and as a consequence sociology is being developed and established as a part of the curricula of higher institutions of learning. Elsewhere in Europe it is exhibiting a sustained growth.

The Task of Sociology

The late arrival of sociology was largely due to the difficulty encountered in reducing the phenomena of a complicated social order to generalizations of a simple and universal character. For the task of a sociology is to put into scientific form the plain perception that there is such a thing as society, that it is constituted of many parallel as well as conflicting interests, that it has had an origin and an evolution in which by some means and in some manner the various interests have preserved a unity, that it is based on principles which may be discovered and under-

stood, and that an understanding of these principles enables a given society to modify the course of its own development. As yet sociology has imperfectly accomplished this task, but it has made praiseworthy advances toward that realization. A judgment regarding whether it will be able to discover a single principle of explanation, or will be constructed on the basis of many principles, lies in the future. And while there is at present a diversity of view and method of treatment among professional sociologists, there is nevertheless fundamental agreement as to the nature of society and the larger features of the nascent science. But there should be little question as to the utility of a science which attempts to give an intelligent account of the total collective life regarded as a totality. The human mind will never rest until it has accomplished this task, and many considerations of practical import demand that such a discipline be worked out.

It is the business of sociology to explain that great phenomenon which we term human society as a collectivity. To accomplish this it would be necessary to give an account of the origin and evolution of society, of the forces or conditions which cause its development or retardation, of the principles on which its organization depends, of the principles of progress, of the possibility of effectual human intervention, and of the agencies by which social control and direction

are to be attained. Sociology seeks to make society an object of scientific study in the same manner that biology, for example, makes the physical organism an object of its study. And as biology seeks to discover the constituent parts and functions of the organism, their relation to each other and to the whole organism, and the laws of growth, so sociology is concerned with the study of social structures and functions, their interrelationships, their relationships with the total collective life, and the principles of development and the laws of progress.

Sociology and Other Social Sciences

Since it is the undertaking of sociology to view society as a whole and always to view individuals and phenomena in their relation to this totality, there can be no difficulty in distinguishing that science from the other social sciences, such as economics, politics, anthropology, and history. Without attempting an exhaustive examination of all the social sciences in relation to sociology or of those considered in this relationship, it may prove useful to suggest the relation of two or three of the other social sciences to sociology. As a preliminary statement, however, it is necessary to point out that the essential difference in general between sociology and those sciences consists in the fact that sociology seeks to correlate all of the fundamental lines of human

interests, giving no particular interest special emphasis, while each of the other social sciences essentially confines its attention to one great interest, treating other interests only in so far as they have a bearing on the dominant interest chosen for emphasis.

There are two sciences which deal with the earlier life of mankind—anthropology and ethnology. The first gives an account of the origin and development of man as a physical individual, and of the origin and classification of races as a physical fact. Ethnology, while it may cover some of that ground, chiefly considers primitive man in his group and cultural aspects, dealing with the beginnings of artifacts, science, belief, systems of numbers and language, and of institutions in general. Because the other social sciences devote themselves to civilized man, anthropology and ethnology restrict themselves to primitive man. In so far as sociology attends to the primitive field it considers the origin of society as such, and gives only a generalized account of the origin and development of particular institutions.

The science of politics, or of government and law, devotes its attention to the political interest. It seeks to explain how government originates, to give a causal account of the great stages of political development, to consider the agencies and means by which the governmental purpose is

executed, and to designate tendencies in the development of the state and methods of betterment. Thus government or politics explains how peoples and communities realize their collective purposes by establishing state agencies. But politics concerns itself with society in general and with other fundamental interests and processes only in so far as those matters have a bearing on government and political affairs. Customs, manners, and the working of the social mind are facts and items which for most part are outside the pale of political considerations, yet they are big factors in society at large. These, together with the correlation of social interests in general, it is the function of sociology to interpret.

While government deals with collective action and purpose as they realize themselves through the state, economics treats chiefly of voluntary individual and collective efforts directed toward the satisfaction of wealth interests. Consequently, economics explains the nature of the material wants, how they create goods or wealth, considers the factors of production in their relation to the production of wealth, the mechanism of exchange and distribution, the principles of finance and taxation, and allied topics. And while the wealth interest is a tremendous factor in human society its consideration does not exhaust the category of human interests nor explain the synthesis of interests save as related to material

satisfactions. Human nature lies behind the wealth interest, and that interest is conditioned by conventions, customs, beliefs, social currents of almost a cosmical sweep, class and caste prejudice, and racial antipathies, which it is the business of sociology to treat, together with its general synthetic task.

Thus it is to be observed that to each social science is given its particular and special task in the total economy of the social sciences. No one of these sciences can do the work of the others save at the expense of changing its nature and ceasing to be itself. Their relationship is not a question of priority, of superior dignity, or of higher and lower. Each one is dignified in the doing of its work well. On the basis of the division of labor pertaining to each and all of them working together in a common domain there should obtain among the social sciences the largest measure of coöperation.

CHAPTER II

THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY

IT is necessary to distinguish between the different meanings of the term society. The sociological meaning of "society" is distinct from that employed popularly in such phrases as "the best society," and "going into society." This popular use of the term reflects a narrow, special significance, pertaining, as it does, to but one feature of the group life. Even among sociologists and social scientists generally the term "society" possesses several meanings. It is employed as a generic term to express the characteristics of associational life in general; it is used also to denote various special forms of group life, such as the family, the state, the city, the nation, the church, and organized labor. Hence, it appears that the word "society," when used sociologically, may mean human associations generally, just as "humanity" signifies all kinds of men; or a particular society like the city or nation; or a group of men within a given society who are bound together by a strong common interest such as commercial, labor, and other kinds of organizations; or, finally, it may mean the civilized world viewed in its associational aspect. The last interpreta-

tion corresponds to the "world-society," so far as one exists; for, of course, a complete world-society cannot appear until all races and groups of men are brought into an interfunctioning relationship with one another.

Where Society Begins

Sociologists have engaged in an interesting discussion of the question, Where does society begin? That their conclusions differ is due to the fact that they have not agreed in their choice of characteristics which shall serve as the criterion of societal life. Thus one eminent writer lays emphasis on the rational factor, to the exclusion of the instincts and emotions and, as a consequence, he places the origin of society neither among animals nor at the beginning of the human species but far up in the course of the evolution of man. Another distinguished writer goes to the other extreme, and noting the ease and celerity with which emotional phenomena sweep through vast populations, he makes suggestion the criterion of society. Upon this basis society would have its origin in the course of evolution wherever the psychical process of suggestion makes its appearance.

While neither position is correct in characterizing the essentials of society, the latter view permits the closer approximation to the origin of society. Society embraces both coöperation and

conflict, and a theory of its origin must allow for both processes. It also is founded on both the emotional and rational processes, the latter constituting the dominating factor in the most advanced stages of social evolution but being correspondingly vague and feeble in the earliest stages.

On the emotional side, there are certain instincts common to the higher animals, at least, which impelled toward a collective existence. Sex, maternal and parental instincts, and the love of companionship are sufficient to account for the initial small and somewhat durable groupings. The maternal and parental instincts could be operative forces only among the higher animals, since they do not appear among the lower ones. Sex appears to have made its appearance among the metazoa, so that sex instinct must have acted as a uniting bond, of at least a temporary nature, among all forms of life since the protozoon stage. Gregariousness is a phenomenon of practically all forms of life, but whether among the lowest forms the love of companionship serves as the nexus it is difficult to say, for it is conceivable that some of the various tropisms act as the segregating agent.

Society of a more rational type undoubtedly emerges whenever plastic imitation appears, and this is noticed among the higher animals. The young animal learns many fighting, hunting, and

coöperative actions by observing and imitating the activities of the adults. Indeed it is often the case that the parents actively engage in the process of teaching their young fighting, flying, and hunting tactics. Each new generation learns the reactions of the preceding generation, among which is a considerable fund of societal responses—namely, coöperative actions. Occasionally, very infrequently indeed, a useful variation appears and because it is useful it is imitated and transmitted to succeeding generations, by which means society slowly evolves. But not until man comes upon the scene and undergoes considerable mental evolution does the rational factor enter largely as a positive contributing agent to social evolution.

Imitation doubtless accounts for initial like-mindedness, agreement, coöperation; but alone it cannot account for disagreement and conflict. The power to imitate is the product of heredity and is based on the biological inheritance of similar nervous and other bodily structures. But since heredity also includes variation it follows that some biological structures will appear which differ to a greater or less degree from the parent structures. The reactions of these structures are not always of the passively imitative kind, and the variants may be counted on to come into conflict at times with the group custom. Especially when the rational element, as in the case of man,

has developed considerably does the conflict of interest become strong, for the desire of possession, unmodified by altruism, is sufficient to impel the individual or groups of individuals having interests in common against the current of the common weal.

This insufficient outline of the stage of evolution at which society originates indicates that society had begun long before the appearance of the human species. But it is essential to observe, however, that not all seeming societal animal groupings are necessarily such. Thus the formation of a flock of swans when swimming and of geese when flying is possibly wholly a biological matter, being transmitted by means of physical inheritance and unmodified by experience. But the dam-building of beavers, nest-construction of birds, and tactics of hunting and associating of animals generally are susceptible of modification by group experience and in a measure are continued by the process of social heredity.

Continuity of Human and Animal Societies

A large part of the most fruitful scientific insight attained in biological and sociological fields has come as the result of viewing life and society as evolutionary processes. Were the developmental principles embedded in modern biological, psychological, and sociological thought eliminated there would be left almost an empty shell. Suffi-

cient evidence has been gathered to demonstrate the truth of evolution to fair-minded people. It is not in place now to give that evidence and we will take the truth of evolution for granted.

It is sufficient to remind ourselves that man is the descendant of a long series of ancestral animal forms having their beginning with the unicellular organism. His more immediate ancestor was not the ape or the monkey, but a member of a stock of which these forms were variants. What our remote human ancestor was like we now begin to comprehend from a study of recent archeological remains, such as the Javanese Man (*Pithecanthropus Erectus*), the Heidelberg Man, the Neanderthal Man, and the Sussex Man. The gap between man and his animal ancestors is being filled in by such "missing links," and the idea of physical continuity is hardly any longer a "theory."

Believing in man's physical descent, there can be little difficulty in conceiving of man's intellectual descent; or, as Drummond preferred to call it, man's "ascent." Mind is invariably associated with body and it unfolds itself in its structural and functional manifestation as fast as the physical mechanism attains organization. The senses appear with the formation of the special sense organs and intelligence grows apace with the development of brain and the differentiation of the nervous structure.

In like manner we conceive there has been a continuous series of societies from the time when the first genuine social plasm arose down to the present. The fund of experience has accumulated gradually throughout the existence of all those myriads of succeeding generations, making itself felt in the direction of modifying individual actions but slightly, but gaining qualifying and checking power with its increase, until, as thought, sentiment, custom, organization, it wields an imperial scepter. Social instincts and sympathies have intensified; race experience has enlarged until it has taxed the mechanism of transmission; altruism and reason have expanded and changed the course of events. But in a fundamental sense the mighty civilization of today is the offspring and descendant of the narrow, shrinking animal society of millions of years ago.

Earliest Human Society

No one knows exactly what the first human society was like, but it must have been slightly more advanced than the society of the highest kinds of animals, such as that of the apes, and less advanced than that of present primitive men, such as the Akkas of Africa, the Veddahs of Ceylon, and the Fuegians of Patagonia. Present primitive men, although low down in the societal scale, do not by any means represent initial primi-

tive man. Ethnologists have arrived at the opinion, as the result of the discoveries of human remains in undisturbed strata of the early quaternary and possibly the late tertiary geological periods, that man appeared approximately one-half million to one million years ago. Examination of skeletons and restorations of skeletons from skulls, femurs, and other skeletal fragments has demonstrated that there have been two or three distinct stages of anatomical development below the present human form. We must conceive an accompanying form of association which would be appropriate to less developed brains and minds. Our present primitive groups of the most undeveloped type are kinship groups, but in that earliest society the idea of kinship had not yet originated. But what is the most like kinship relation and was the foundation of it is the relation between mother and offspring. Mothers would protect their offspring until they were able to care for themselves and it would be natural for the young when grown to settle near the mothers. We could thus think of a little association of a rather loose sort. Perhaps the fathers formed a more or less temporary association with the mother also, and a weaker one with the children. In time the ties strengthened, sentiment grew, benefits from coöperation in times of danger became dimly apparent. Ultimately the idea of kinship developed. When this point was

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reached human society of a permanent and somewhat organized type was born.

The characteristics of such a group were few and meager. The love of companionship undoubtedly was present. The reproductive instinct must have been the dominant bond between adults, and maternal and filial affection the strongest influences among adults and the young. Reason was only in its infancy and seldom or never made collective matters an object of attention. The social relations which existed, collective modes of action, were determined by custom, and were changed but little in generations. Before the age of invention the food supply depended on the bounty of nature. Populations in given localities had to be small because of food limits. When numbers increased above this limit new groups, as they formed, were forced to migrate into new localities, and because of this the typical society was small. A premium was placed on the form of group which coöperated to increase the supply of food. Such a society stood the best chance of survival, and ultimately superseded the non-coöperative kind. Sympathy of an instinctive sort ameliorated existence but little. Brute strength made right, and altruism, or developed sympathy, was yet to evolve and become a checking and humanizing force. Religion, which, when it arose, developed as an inference, could not appear until reason became stronger.

Education consisted in teaching the young how to get food, to shelter and protect themselves, and perhaps how to use the club and the eolith.

Having thus sketched briefly in general terms the situation in which society arose, and the origin of early human societal groups, we are prepared to consider somewhat more in detail those initial beginnings and their course of development.

CHAPTER III

ORIGIN OF RACES AND INSTITUTIONS

THE sociological conception of institutions is somewhat different from that in common use. An institution, in popular opinion, possesses the characteristics not only of fixity and permanence, but also possesses a material foundation and form. When the average individual thinks of an institution, it is likely that his chief thought is of buildings and lands. But sociologically, institutions are the immaterial forms of association, the various types of activities into which the social mind is organized, and the fixed ideas which represent social processes. Thus the institutional characteristics of the school consists in the permanent manner society is organized for the purpose of training its citizenship. The public mind is organized into political institutions to carry on affairs of state. In a real sense the typewriter and other machines are institutions because the mechanical principles they involve are permanently imbedded in the social mind as ideas. Every idea which persists in the minds of many individuals and is passed on to succeeding generations has an institutional aspect. Consequently, the term institutions embraces not only the great dominant organizations of society, but

customs, conventions, and all enduring ideas and modes of reacting.

Sociological Meaning of Institutions

While, indeed, there is justification for considering all enduring ideas institutions, as a matter of convenience in sociology it is desirable to treat certain great groups of ideas which are organized about centers of interest as representative social institutions. As a consequence, the activities of individuals are observed to coördinate themselves for the realization of several great motives or interests. While somewhat different classifications of the chief interests may be made, the most usable one for our purpose is found in viewing human beings as organized to realize their domestic, political, religious, industrial, cultural, and sociability aims. Practically all of the permanent ideas involved in societal life are associated with these larger motives and assist in their realization. Thus the ideas of beauty would constitute a part of the cultural, those of health would fall within the political arrangements to secure sanitation. Ethical ideas, however, cannot be classified under any one of these heads exclusively, since they involve the proper adjustment of social relationship in all lines of endeavor. Again, certain fixed ideas such as language and numerical systems do not represent special centers of interest but they rather constitute necessary basic

agencies for the realization of fundamental societal motives.

Origin of Races

In some respects, race is a social institution because it represents a persistent idea in society, and affects the method of coördinating human beings. But because in its origin it is so largely a biological product and because it does not represent a specific sphere of societal interest, it is best to accord it a treatment apart from and prior to social institutions. The consideration of race is important because race and the results of race differences have been influential factors in the development of society. Ethnic differences have acted as a prominent cause of nearly all wars, and race prejudice plays a strong part in our race problems. Class differences, and especially those of caste, are due in part to racial factors.

Ethnologists are practically agreed that the region of man's origin was a vast one comprising southern Asia, northern Africa, and southern and western Europe, including the southern Baltic regions. In this region are found the highest forms of both extinct and existent apes, and of the most undeveloped prehistoric man. It is possible that the original human race stock approximated the Caucasian, since the Caucasian is the most variable of the races and its prototype would offer a plastic foundation for differentiation.

From this region the original stock, when it became populous, and perhaps after some crude protective and offensive weapons had been invented, migrated into other parts of the world. Because those new habitats possessed different environments, such as climate and foods, men underwent physical changes, such as differentiations of stature, complexion, form of head, color and form of hair, color and shape of eyes, and form of nose. The people who settled to the northeast came to have an assemblage of those characteristics seen in the Mongolians, differing essentially from that of the original stock. Those who settled in the south became possessed of another assemblage of characteristics, seen in the Negroes and other dark peoples. No doubt the influence of light in making protective color pigments, and of the chemical constituents of different foods acting as bleaching constituents had much to do with forming complexions. The structure of the follicle in which the roots of the hair is embedded accounts for the form of the hair. Other changes are only partly accounted for.

The various peoples in the new habitats also built up distinctive customs, languages, religions, and it must have required ages to work out these physical and social changes. By reason of the physical and social transformations, these peoples became distinctly different, and in after ages

when further migrations brought portions of the now distinct races into contact with one another, since there was no remembrance of common origin, they met as entire strangers. Their differences, especially those of appearance, aroused deep-seated prejudice, as the new and the strange always do among the majority of men. Because friendship was based on kinship and non-kindred were considered enemies, conflict ensued and the stronger either killed or subordinated the weaker as slaves; at least, race prejudice was ushered in.


In much the same manner, within a given race of people migrations into remote regions took place, and in response to the physical environment minor physical differences appeared. Likewise language, religion, and other customs underwent a differentiation. As a consequence, when, in later times, these differentiated groups met they were enemies, and there ensued conflict, extermination or subordination. In the case of the subordination of one group by another, a compounding of groups took place. A long process of fusion by intermarriage and social readjustment then occurred until at last a resultant society emerged. In their turn, compound societies merged and fused with other compound groups, and these doubly compounded societies compounded again with others of the same kind. It was by means of such compounding and conse-

quent expansion of societal organization that our modern nations were formed.

Language

The institution of language deserves consideration as typifying the basic agencies by means of which societal interests in general are realized. Like many other social phenomena, language had its beginning among animals. Under a system of struggle and competition, there would be a greater chance of survival among those animals which could coöperate. But since the basis of coöperation is the ability to communicate, coöperative groups could develop only in so far as their members were able to transfer their ideas, and the medium of this was a communication system, initially a system of signs and sounds.

It is well established that the higher animals are adepts in recognizing the significance of the actions, attitudes, and movements of their own kind and of other kinds of animals; and that those of some species understand and employ numerous cries and intonations. Human beings, as they emerged from the brute plane of existence, possessed these facilities of communication, and by conscious effort expanded and perfected them. But as Drummond says, "Down to this present hour there are still the three great kinds of language. The movement of foot or ear has been evolved into the modern gesture or grimace ;



the note or cry into a word, and the intonation into an emphasis or inflection of the voice."

While sign language possesses advantages for primitive people living under certain conditions, as in the case of the Siouan and Cheyenne Indians inhabiting the plains, and while it is still extensively used by deaf-mutes, it is not susceptible to that differentiation which makes possible the transmission of the minute shades of thought civilization demands, nor available for modern modes of communication. Because of their availability, sounds and the symbols which represent ideas have become the primary vehicles of communication. Since the appearance of the use of sounds to transfer ideas, the great stages of the evolution of the communicative system have been the development of different kinds of words which our parts of speech represent, the creation of an alphabet, of writing, of printing, of newspapers, of the telegraph and telephone. Each one of these stages of improvement has formed the basis of a larger area of coöperative effort and intensified the human bond.

Briefly stated, the functions which language has performed are as follows: (1) it developed in response to a social demand, since a communicating system is necessary for the existence of an intensive coöperative life; (2) it stimulated association and thus promoted survival through coöperative response; (3) it furnished a vehicle

for the exercise of intelligence and of sympathetic understanding, thus promoting intellectual development, reducing friction, and expanding sociality; (4) after the development of written symbols a record of events became possible, thus providing for the perpetuation of a knowledge of the past and laying the foundation of history and of science.

It is to be remembered that whereas language was built by society and is, as a consequence, a product of coöperative life, at the same time it constituted the foundation of coöperation and made society possible.

The State

By the term state we mean any people that occupies a definite territory and has many of its activities controlled and regulated by its central government. Many *a priori* theories have sought to explain its origin, such as the lawgiver, the theocratic, and the social contract theories. These *a priori* theories are being replaced by sociological conceptions. Noted sociologists, such as Gumpowicz, Ratzenhofer, and Ward have espoused the conflict theory of origin. According to this theory, every state has been the result of conflict, the conquest and subordination of one people by another, and a slow gradual fusion of the two peoples physically and culturally. Previously, people beaten in battle had been exterminated or


eaten. When men became advanced enough to make use of captives as a labor force, slavery ensued from war. The initial state arose as a system devised by the conquerors for the use and exploitation of the conquered. At first a military system, it formulated rules of procedure for the subjugated that in time became law, which, originally made for the conquered, after considerable fusion had occurred, came to be applied to all members of the resultant society. The rigid caste lines which at first existed slowly crumbled as the abler members of the captive class were increasingly taken into the business of the ruling class, and became overseers, superintendents, and managers. Finally, intermarriage was legalized, and legal miscegenation, which previously took place illicitly, completed the physical fusion. The customs of both peoples underwent a modification, new customs were evolved, and institutions of many kinds which were used by all were established. And along with the other processes which were at work went the gradual genesis of loyalty to the "fatherland," which served to preserve the state against dissolution and conquest.

Closely akin to the conquest theory is that of Oppenheimer, which may be termed the exploitation theory. The chief point of difference between the two theories is one of emphasis. According to the latter theory, the state arises by a process of conflict, indeed, but it is a one-sided

conflict. A strong, militant, nomadic people possesses the lust of exploitation, and discovering a peaceful peasant population, it invades its territory, easily conquers it, and organizes a system under which the subordinate group hands over to the conqueror the larger share of the products of its labor. A system is developed by which the conquerors are continuously able to collect the forced tribute from the conquered, but what begins as a matter of forceful compulsion grows into a system of acquiescence, and what was previously tribute becomes the taxes levied by a ruling class. Custom and tradition arise with their powerful sanctions of the "established order," and the shrewd ruling class employ all available cultural and religious agencies to inculcate among the subordinate class the sanctity and inviolability of that order.

Thus the system of continuous exploitation which the conquerors established is the beginning of the state. Its motive and essence is the exploitation of a peaceful, productive class by an organized militant class, and this initial principle of exploitation of one class by another largely, though less conspicuously, obtains in all modern states.


While these theories are likely to give a rude shock to the unsophisticated and traditional minds, they are doubtless true in their essential characteristics. However, since its origin, the



state has undergone a considerable modification in the direction of becoming more responsive to the needs of all classes. By reason of the gradual diffusion of knowledge and intelligence through all of the strata of society, the state has passed out of the exclusive control of a privileged order and has assumed a multitude of functions for the common good which were previously private matters. Thus coinage and the regulation of money, the maintenance of armies, the levying and collection of taxes, the exercise of the judicial function, the transportation of mail, the conducting of an educational system, and the control of land titles are some of the more important duties which all modern states have assumed. And it is undoubtedly true that the masses of people have come to regard the state as their best defense against abuses, and to expect of it the assumption of all duties which are deemed necessary to the common good.

Religion

Religion, popularly, means worship, a plan of eternal salvation, and often morality. But viewed genetically it signifies a belief in the existence of superhuman agencies and in man's ability to influence or control them. This conception of religion is broad enough to comprehend the central principle of all religions from the lowest to the highest.



Religion must have made its initial appearance in the course of evolution somewhere between animals and existing primitive man, since the former do not and the latter do exhibit religious phenomena. It could not have originated as an instinct because instincts are biological in origin and nature, and arise as bodily reactions for the adjustment of the organism to physical conditions. As such they are transmitted by physical inheritance, and only variations of structure and function useful for securing food, protection, and maintenance of species are capable of perpetuation. To say that religion arose as a "perception of the infinite," or as an "innate idea," explains nothing, since the former resolves itself into an instinct, and the modern psychology has amply disproved the possibility of innate conceptions. Consequently, like other ideas, religion must have arisen as an inference, a groping of the primitive mind for an explanation of phenomena for which it had no scientific apprehension in terms of natural cause and effect. But the animal mind knows something of cause and effect, and the primitive man's mind possessed the tendency to assume causes for phenomena. Since natural explanations of the many surrounding mysteries were impossible, it was inevitable and logical that supernatural ones should have appeared. A study of primitive peoples makes it evident that the earliest religious conception must have been a

vague dread of a mysterious something which with time and under the stress of crises and social conditions became differentiated into superhuman personalities.

A casual knowledge of primitive life is sufficient to indicate that primitive society was saturated with the belief in superhuman agencies, and that the world was conceived as a realm of demons and spirits. While the belief in spirits was universal, every deity was ethnic and its power was circumscribed by the confines of its believers. Consequently, the adoption of an individual into another group necessitated a change of deities, and the rite of adoption was one of accepting the gods of another people. But the combining and enlarging of social groups by means of conflict brought a consequent elevation and expansion of the conquerors' deities and an accompanying depression of the influence of those of the conquered. By means of this process, some gods became great national deities. With the expansion of knowledge of the world through the mingling of races and the growth of speculative imagination, a universal deity was at last conceived, and among advanced peoples polytheism was displaced by monotheism.

Another characteristic of the evolution of religion is observed in the growth of social agents and organizations. At the very outset there could have been no religious functionaries, and

every man was his own mediator. But because some men were adapted to dreaming dreams and seeing visions, special religious agents arose. The earliest ones were in the nature of sorcerers and conjurors, because at that time all spirits were conceived to be evil, and had to be frightened away or outwitted. Hence the medicine men were the earliest religious agents, and their chief work was to drive out evil demons by means of beating, creating great noises and stenches, or to counteract their influence by magic. With the rise of ancestor worship, however, since, while they lived, ancestors exercised beneficent influences, deities were conceived as more kindly disposed. As a consequence, the method of controlling superhuman agencies changed to the use of pacific means. Communal sacrifice, incense, and, finally, prayers and worship became the accepted formulas.

Whenever religious mediation, the control of the deities, passed into the hands of a special class of men, an enormous influence over society was established. The religious functionary held the keys of life and death, of disaster and fortune, of access to heaven or condemnation to perdition. As a consequence, the teachings of religious functionaries brought immediate compliance, and the lives of men and the social order were deeply influenced. Tabus, restraints, commands, interdicts, penances, must be obeyed



under penalty of offended deity. The religious functionaries maintained a closed organization; there was no open shop or opportunity for boycott, no chance of appeal. Because of this, much cunning and craft were employed by medicine men and priesthoods to enrich themselves and to further the influence of their orders. On the other hand, a well-disposed and beneficent religious order could do much to promote social well-being. Not only might it stimulate philanthropic efforts, but at times seek to build a social democracy.

A further tendency in religious development has been toward making religion more ethical. In so far as the earliest religion was largely a matter of individuals it possessed no ethical import. But when it became an organized affair, so that it affected the relations of men to one another, it possessed a socio-ethical basis. While religion has always been dynamic in securing action on the part of individuals, its tendency has usually been one of conservation rather than one of progress. Because it has, until recently, been a state agency and, as a consequence, an affair of ruling classes, it has been obliged to support the established social order. Its ethics, for this reason, has most often been a static and conventional one. But in so far as ecclesiasticism has been broken into competitive sects and there has occurred a divorce between state and

church, religion has shown signs of teaching a dynamic ethics.

The Industrial Order

Like the state, the industrial order was a late social arrival. Initial man foraged for his food and wore few clothes. Later, after the invention of weapons and snares, he lived on game. Agriculture crept in slowly in the shape of hoe-culture, supplementing the hunting and fishing. Wherever pastoral life occurred, wants were satisfied by means of the flocks.

Consequently, early social life was industrially undifferentiated. The industrial order emerged only when occupational divisions of labor based on sex-differences were replaced by those of function. This could take place only to a slight degree in small pastoral groups, where inequalities of wealth made two classes, owners and hired herdsmen. But when a number of territorial groups resulted from conflict, a varied industrial differentiation arose. Not only did subjugation introduce a slave class, but plunder accumulated wealth, wants multiplied, and the workers broke up into distinct occupations. Besides, in a large territory, localities differed in products; and fields, forests, and mines must be worked. Further, the raw products had to be worked up into consumptive goods, materials be transported from place to place; traders and merchants were demanded.

Thus emerged the systems of labor, of extractive industries, of transportation and of exchange.

The growth of the industrial system has been conditioned by the appearance of certain mediating agencies or connecting factors.

First, it has rested on the efficiency of the means of transporting goods. Roads have been a necessity, and we find a successive series of landways coming into existence, such as individual paths between neighboring peoples, trails for large bodies of moving herds and peoples, ill-kept roads, highways, and turnpikes, systems of macadamized roads, railroads. Accompanying this development has been a parallel series of agencies of transportation: men as burden bearers, animals, drags attached to animals, carts, wagons, locomotives and cars. In like manner, transporting agents used on water have evolved from the raft and dugout to sailboat, steamboat, and steamship.

Second, because industry, in its more advanced stages of development, is carried on to furnish goods at a distance, the consequent commerce has depended on the efficiency of the exchange system. The earliest method of exchange was one of making presents with the expectation of return gifts. Then came barter, which was cumbersome and inconvenient because it was difficult to make change. Markets and market places helped to simplify this by bringing into one

vicinity a great assortment of articles of various grades of value. Likewise, the adoption of some commodity, such as a quantity of wheat or a goat, as a standard of value, marked a step in advance, but could not obviate the inconvenience of making change. This could be met only by the creation of some commodity which contained great value in a small unit, was universally desirable, was easily worked into shape, and was durable. The precious metals, especially gold, offered such a medium, and coinage established standards and variety of value. Not only could money facilitate exchange of goods, but it served as a great spur to the accumulation of wealth, because it made possible an easy conversion of wealth into goods to satisfy every kind of want.

Third, the development of a communication system conditioned industrial development. Since the growth of a transportation system also accomplished the end of communication, it is only needful to advert to later phases of development. With the appearance of the locomotive and railway, it was imperative that there should be a swift transmission of reports of the movements of trains. This came with the invention of the telegraph, but this invention was soon adapted also to sending market reports and to ordering and reporting goods. Other agents, such as the telephone and wireless, are competing systems,

and it is evident that a world commerce would be impossible without these lightning-like servitors.

A treatment of the industrial system, however brief, should make some allusion to developments which have occurred in the status of labor, in the growth of productive capital, in the systems of manufacture and production, and to the rise of the capitalistic system and methods of organizing business. But as the briefest outline of the changes which have taken place in society in those instances is obviously impossible for this volume, we must be contented with their mention.

The social results of the industrial order are obvious. That order multiplied wants, put a premium on accumulation of wealth and attainment of power, helped discipline a labor force, made places for varying talent, in connection with the state established class distinctions, and enormously promoted social organization and structure. While the results were generally beneficial, the means used to secure the establishment of the order have often been brutal, though in large measure inherent in the age.

The Family

By means of the family the race is continued and society made possible. Moreover, the family places the first social imprint on the individual and orientates him for a larger collective life. While now it is but one of many bridges over

which the past moves into the present, originally it was the only one.

In the historical sense, the family means the association of offspring and one or both parents during a greater or less interval. The natural motives for creating the family are the reproductive instincts and parental love. The first secures mating, the second the nourishing and rearing of children. Parental love is differentiated into maternal love and paternal love. Of these, the former is by far the older, since the constitution of the female among higher animals creates a durable physiological nexus between the mother and offspring, and imposes on the latter a period of dependence, with a consequent demand for maternal care. The function of the male, up to the later stages of evolution, consists in fertilization, and beyond this he sustains no fostering relations to the young. However, among some of the higher mammals and birds, the male parent bestows upon the offspring a fostering attention, and in a real sense the institution of marriage begins.

While the male sometimes protected and fed the female during incubation and the period of childbirth, among the higher mammals generally his parental contributions were few and short-lived, and family life centered about the maternal female. It was hers to bear the young, to suckle and protect them, and, in some instances, to pro-

vide food for them and to teach them to obtain it for themselves. And doubtless this represented the situation among the earliest human beings. It must have been a long time before the male parent was harnessed into the family life by his affections and by custom, and thereby compelled to share in its responsibilities. If by marriage we mean a somewhat permanent relation between mother and father, it may be said that marriage had its beginnings among animals but that it was not greatly developed until well along in the course of human evolution.

With regard to the forms of marriage there has been something of an evolution. It is not likely that humanity has passed through a universal stage of promiscuity, though in some primitive groups there are indications that present sex arrangements presuppose a prior promiscuity. Nor is it clear that either of the forms of marriage—monogamy, polygamy, and polyandry—held the field exclusively in early society and that the consequent development evolved the other forms in a regular order. Probably all of these kinds of marriage, and group marriage besides, existed side by side in the beginning, with conditions placing a premium on polygamy and group marriage, but with equality in the number of the sexes dominating the situation. The evolution of marriage consists of a competitive strife between these forms, with adaptability

to human purposes favoring monogamy. That form of marriage realizes sex justice by giving every man and woman the privileges of family life; respects the principle of sex jealousy in both men and women; is most favorable to the physical, mental, and social development of children; and affords the best-defined method of tracing lineage and transferring property. Because of these and other characteristics, monogamic marriage has become the prevailing form among civilized peoples.

Monogamic marriage has undergone a development in the direction of establishing a greater equality between husband and wife and in according a more favorable position to the children. The patriarchal family is typical of ancient family life in which the patriarch was absolute over wives and children. The Roman patriarchal family, however, was monogamic, but the father possessed no less despotic powers. But civilization has reduced the authority of the father, enlarged the functions and privileges of the mother, and placed the training and disciplining of children on a less severe and more ethical basis. And while increasing divorce has been an accompaniment of the evolution of society toward a more equitable social order and a fairer family institution, it is to be viewed as a temporary symptom and incidence of a transitional stage rather than as inherent in democracy. The crea-

tion of higher ideals of the family and of the marriage relations by a due process of education may be expected to reduce the number of divorces and to place the family on a more wholesome footing.

Education

By the educational institution is meant the system established by society for the transmission of the principles of social experience from generation to generation for the purpose of equipping the young for life. Or education may be viewed as a direct endeavor to socialize developing individuals. While at present there are many agencies which help secure the equipping of the young, education is to be regarded as the most explicit and universal scheme of socialization. Only a few pointed remarks may be permitted.

First, during social evolution organized society has made an increasingly explicit attempt to educate the young. Before the state arose, primitive society exercised a somewhat implicit educational function. To the older men and to the women was given the task of teaching the boys and girls certain of their duties. The knowledge of the larger part of their activities, however, was gained by imitation and experience. After the state arose and social classes were formed, only the favored few were educated; the masses, being slaves, were trained by imitation and com-

pulsion. In more recent times, religious sects undertook to educate men for religious functions, but incidentally opened their academic courses to all men. But because sectarian teaching formed too narrow a foundation for social activities generally, and also was possible only to those fortune had favored, the state was impelled to assume universal training functions and explicitly to create a citizenship.

Second, education has developed away from traditional lore chiefly toward bestowing scientific principles. A large portion of primitive education consisted of embedding in the minds of the young the folk-lore and myths of the group. In later society, education was a class affair and consisted of transmitting the class view and learning, together with an effort to build up linguistic powers and to give a religious interpretation of the world. Nor has present education been emancipated from largely dealing in traditional learning and in promoting the remote. However, the theological interpretation of the world has given way in state schools to the teaching of science, and there is a growing emphasis of the rational.

Third, in recent years education has made an attempt to recognize the complexity of society and to prepare for callings as well as for life in general. The view that education is only cultural or disciplinary failed to recognize that society has

grown and that it demands many diverse functions. Such a view was suitable for a narrow society and for caste purposes, but it could not meet the demands of present conditions. This could be done only by recognizing the scientific and technical character of modern society, and by establishing varied courses to train for the different callings. This does not mean, however, that a larger interpretation of the world and of life is denied or that the common principles of citizenship are withheld.

Society has also evolved means for continuing the education of the individual after he has become adult. By means of newspapers, books, periodicals, chautauquas, lyceums, university and college extension, and cultural associations of many kinds it seeks to supplement the field of experience. If we view all cultural processes as education, it is manifest that practically all of the great societal interests with which this chapter deals exert a greater or less influence in the direction of furthering information and thought.

For the sake of the casual reader, it may be well to indicate that while certain great lines of social development have been sketched as if they originated and evolved somewhat independently of each other, in reality such has not been the case. Society has always existed as a unit, and all structures and interests have originated and grown together. The several structures did not

spring up apart from each other, but originated as functions of the community life as a whole. While at times there has been need of bringing some social structure into completer harmony with the type of the given society to which it belongs, this necessity has not arisen because that structure grew up apart from the society and required to be brought into the community of institutions, but because it has suffered a divergence from the aim and spirit of the larger community, rendering it imperative that it should be socialized.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION

THE conception has long been in the minds of thoughtful men that human society undergoes a development. Thus Plato believed that government had a regular series of stages through which it moved, returning in cyclical fashion to its initial form, from which it set out anew to repeat its round. Vico taught that society passed through successive phases of development and then deteriorated by going back to the initial stage, to begin the process of development anew. Written works on history have been an expression of the idea that nations and states come into existence by degress and pass out to give way to stronger ones.

Evolution as Quantitative Transformation

The commoner thought of evolution is that it is a growth. Plants and animals grow. Things appear which formerly had no existence in the forms they assume. To the popular mind this chiefly means a quantitative increase. Thus sand hills grow as the particles of flint are gathered up by the wind and piled up in one heap. The crystal develops as the elements are arranged in

geometrical lines and figures so that they represent a larger mass. The seed placed in the soil germinates, sends its rootlets into the soil, where they expand into a system of sustention, and shoots its stem into the air, where it branches and leafs, growing but a season or through many years and centuries. So much is visible to the eyes of all.

Society likewise undergoes a quantitative transformation. Beginning as a pair of primitive beings just emerged above the plane of brute existence, there has been a series of successive reproductive events, with a consequent multiplication of human beings until the original pair is represented by approximately 1,600,000,000 individuals. Not all of these persons are welded together into one society. Some day they will be. Then there will be a world-society which was evolved from an original family. But we have only to consult the statistics of our nation, our state, or our city to get the visible facts of growth. Thus our nation has grown from about 4,000,000 people in 1790 to over 100,000,000 inhabitants now. The cities of the nation grew in population 11,826,000 between 1900 and 1910.

As Qualitative Transformation

Further reflection indicates that besides quantitative increase evolution represents qualitative changes. The plant is different from the seed


from which it sprang, the chick from its parent egg, and the crystal from the particles which were organized into it. Some principle of organization has been presiding in the process of enlargement. Substances gathered from the soil by the roots of the plant have undoubtedly in some way organized into the enlarging structure, so causing the enlargement. But the material assembled in this manner from the soil and atmosphere is altogether different in character from the material previous to the segregation. There has been a vitalizing process, and matter which formerly was called inorganic has been converted into matter which is termed organic. When the organism is done with it, it may again pass into the inorganic form; but so long as it performs its function in and for the organism, it is vital, living. However life began, it has the power of bestowing its peculiar characteristics on the material it requires to build itself up.

While not to the same degree that obtains in organic life, there is a vitalizing process going on in the development of society. The original social plasm has passed down its socializing tendency and imprint, and, as a consequence, every human being is worked upon during his growth and impressed with a collective characteristic. While some of the societal qualities are inborn, such as the love of companionship, others are transmitted in the social environment. Intelligent

sympathy, appreciation, altruism, coöperative desire and ability, social vision, are some of them. As a consequence, a family, a neighborhood, a state, a nation, or a party is more and something different than the mere sum of the individuals which statistically constitute them. The constituent individuals have been merged in a sympathetic organic structure which exists as a continuous articulated system in much the same manner as do the particles which have been built into the plant.

As Diversification

Another characteristic is peculiar to growth and evolution. This is diversification, or differentiation. If the plant is different from the constituent elements out of which it is produced, a part of the difference arises by reason of diverging forms. In one sense, differentiation is in the nature of an expansion, since by this means enlargement is provided for. The material represented in a plant could be collected in the fashion a snowball is built, but it would not serve the function of a plant. Differentiation means essentially that growth is expressing itself in the direction of new structures and functions. The germ in the egg works upon the albumen and constructs of it bone, muscle, blood vessels and heart, blood, nerves, skin, feathers, and all the many parts that constitute the chicken. Matter



has taken many new forms, and each form has a function to perform, not for itself, but for the whole organism to which it pertains.

Social evolution has witnessed a similar diversification of parts as communities and groups have enlarged their numbers of inhabitants. The early human group was a most simple affair, as simple in its structure in comparison with modern society as is the egg when compared with the subsequent chick. But greatly increased numbers, wealth, tastes, and wants demanded that many kinds of organizations should exist in order that the varying activities might be carried out. Consequently, many varieties of divisions of labor arose to meet these demands. Keeping house, farming, stock-raising, mining, manufacturing in its many phases, marketing goods, transporting them, preaching, teaching, acting, serving in governmental capacities, singing, painting, sculpturing, are some of the important responses to enlarging demands.

As Integration

And as was said above, all of these functional organizations were welded into a whole as fast as they came into existence. This followed from the fact that every special function was not carried on for itself, but because the larger community demanded it. When the larger society came into being, every farmer, merchant, teacher,

or official was a community servant or server. The teacher did not teach himself, or the preacher preach to himself, or the official administer for himself, since their duties were for the whole community or group in which their services were involved. As a consequence, as fast as differentiation of structures and functions were worked out they were integrated into a vital unity.

As Accommodation

Evolution also involves adaptation and accommodation. It is well known that the forms of plant and animal life have come as the result of a long series of accommodations of plants and animals to the physical conditions in which they lived. Our corn plant is changing its characteristics as it migrates into the colder regions and shorter seasons of the north. When men go to dwell in tropical regions their blood undergoes a change to meet the new demands the climate makes upon the organism. Upon exposure to constantly changing conditions, organisms must either readjust themselves, at first functionally and then structurally, or be eliminated.

Not only has man accommodated himself to conditions as an individual, but also in his collective capacity. The different methods men use in meeting the different climates of the world is an illustration of the general fact. Philippine and Japanese houses are distinctly dissimilar to


the habitations of the men of the inclement regions of Europe and America. Communities living in regions of drought betray different reactions to nature than those inhabiting districts of abundant precipitation. It was previously seen that states and nations go through qualifying processes in their effort to accommodate themselves to nature, and especially to the situations made by the characteristics of surrounding peoples. It is also true that societies change in their response to the necessities of adjusting their structural parts to each other as necessity and occasions arise. A society that could not so accommodate itself would stand a poor chance of survival. Especially in the face of strong competition from other groups, adaptation is a prime requisite of group safety.

Social and Biological Evolution

Societal evolution resembles and differs from other forms of evolution, more pertinently biological evolution. Biological evolution has taken place chiefly by way of physical processes, though in the higher stages the mental and societal have had considerable influence. Variation, heredity, selection—these three processes realizing the method of adjustment to the physical environment—have constituted the steps in the stairway by which plant and animal forms have made the ascent. Variation and heredity

are agencies which are entirely contained within the sphere of the organic processes; the natural conditions favoring and penalizing the varieties of the organic species as they arise is the selective factor, and the outcome observed in the survival of particular organisms is the adaptation or adjustment. That variation taking place by means of heredity which fits into environing conditions is said to be adjusted.

When society begins, the process of evolution is modified. The brain that has been evolving all through the ages and, in an increasing manner, becoming an agent of adaptation to the environment, at last becomes the salient agent in development. While variation, heredity, and natural selection are still operative and act as conditioning factors of evolution, the determinations of the mental agent constitute the central and immediate factors of decision and adaptation. While biological evolution was unconscious, in that no organism involved in the process foresaw or ordained an objective, societal evolution increasingly comprehends foresighted direction, although its initial stage was dominated by the establishment of customary ways of realizing collective action. Thus it is seen that societal variation and heredity are substituted for biological variation and heredity, as the more directly active agents, that the social environment increasingly displaces the physical environment as the



medium to which social forms are adjusted, and that the intellectual interests become the active agents of adaptation.

CHAPTER V

FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE SOCIAL EVOLUTION

DARWIN and other colaborers in the biological field have amply proved there has been a successive development of organic forms, plant and animal. Spencer quite as successfully demonstrated the occurrence of a larger cosmical evolution. That human society participates in the general scheme of development, only the ignorant can doubt. It is therefore in place to review the factors which have promoted and moulded this societal unfolding.

The Physical Environment

Man, like all other organic beings, is and always has been dependent on the physical conditions which surround him. He can no more escape the influence of these factors than he can transport himself bodily to a life on some other planet. His life and all his activities are enmeshed and articulated with the forces and conditions which constitute the physical universe. The associated life of man likewise partakes of this relation of dependence. Collective existence has only a slightly greater power to

modify the physical conditions which obtain than has the individual. Without seeking to estimate the exact force of each one of the physical conditions which have an influence in shaping society, something may be said of them.

What is termed climate has exerted a determining influence on collective life. Temperature, rainfall, humidity, air-velocity, occurrence of storms, sunshine and cloud, make up climate. All or most of these factors decide the amount and quality of plant and animal life which is available for food. Primitive man, especially, was greatly affected by temperature. Before the advent of artificial dwellings, clothing, and fire, men were forced to inhabit the warmer portions of the earth. The early societies, and even civilization itself, courted the torrid, and the warmer portions of the temperate, zones. Only after clothing, fire, and artificial dwellings were discovered could the far north or south be invaded. With all our modern facilities for living, the great bulk of the population of the earth occupies the temperate portions of the globe.

Topography, or configuration of the earth's surface, has an influence on man's distribution. The high altitudes and the mountainous regions have relatively few inhabitants. The lowlands and the plateaus are the homes of the masses of people. Low temperature goes with very high

altitudes, and rough countries make communication difficult.

Closely associated with climate and topography is fertility of the soil. Inherently, an arid or a cold region may be exceedingly fertile, but the dearth of moisture or the low temperature prevents a large production of available food. The arid regions of the United States are particularly rich in soil properties, but they are unavailable for agriculture until an artificial supply of water is provided. The northern portions of Canada have as rich soils as are to be found, yet the short seasons give opportunity for few plants to develop. The lowlands are the homes of mankind because they have fertile soils, sufficient precipitation to insure crops, and generally lie in temperate zones. Like physical bodies in motion, society most commonly follows the line of least resistance, and as a consequence associations of men and civilization have established themselves where obtaining a livelihood was easiest.

The existence of an abundance of animals and plants have had much to do with the establishment of human associations. They afford the food supply and much of the materials for manufacture which the human race has utilized. Like human beings, they thrive best where climate and topography are favorable. Consequently, their supply coincides with the lowland regions of the temperate and torrid zones. Animals have af-

forded the motor power which has been so long used by mankind and which has been a necessary factor in social evolution. Only recently have mechanical motors taken the place of the horse, camel, ox, and other draught and burden-bearing animals. Perhaps the fact that the Americas had so few useful animals for domestication had something to do with the backwardness of social evolution on those continents prior to the coming of the whites. In the case of primitive societies, the presence of many fierce animals, poisonous reptiles, and dangerous insects may greatly hinder the development of collective life. The presence of pestilential swamps, the occurrence of earthquakes and volcanoes, and of violent storms, have likewise been modifying circumstances.

Inherent Impulses and Desires

The external factors which we have just reviewed could not alone account for collective or individual activities any more than could the atmosphere, the gun, and the bullet explain the speed of the projectile. An inner motor force is a necessary provision in each case. The impulses and desires are the motor forces in the case of men and society. Without them, nothing would occur. Plant and animal growth may take place by means of metabolism, but the complicated movements of animals and men are depend-

ent on new factors—instincts and wants. On the basis of their inherited instincts, human beings develop desires and wants which entice and drive them into complex activities and cause them to enter into coöperation and conflict with other men. These wants and desires are the so-called “social forces.”

Several transformations have taken place in human desires which have had a large bearing on collective life.

First, there has been an expansion or diversification. As compared with the few wants of animals of the higher type, human beings present an army of appetites and desires. The lowest type of present primitive men are satisfied with a small variety of articles and experiences. The wants of civilized man are as the sands of the sea in number. The names of all the consumption articles which are produced for use would be but a partial list of the desires of mankind, or at least an indication of the differentiation the original stock of desires has undergone. In one way civilization may be said to be the expression of the wants, and its measure to be indicated by their expansion. In another way its complexity is the product of the diversification which has occurred. Reduce human desires to a half-dozen, and civilization vanishes, the complicated social structure crumbles.

Second, desires and wants have been standard-


ized and rendered persistent. As in the case of diversification, this has taken place very gradually. Early man was persistent in satisfying his wants somewhat spasmodically. He went after food when he was hungry, and was inactive between times. Modern men are active day by day. Only by this means are they able to satisfy their multitude of desires. Because wants have been standardized, there is no chance of let-up on work. The standard set by the community or by the set to which the individual belongs decrees that activity shall be persistent. Thus desires and wants have become communityized, socialized. Each new standard set is not easily lost. Society goes to successively higher standards.

Third, there has been an intensification of the higher forms of desire. Primitive desires concerned themselves with material and physical things. Gradually the intellectual, the ethical, the esthetic, and other higher desires entered. With continued evolution these gained strength, until in recent times large numbers of people possess them in strong measure. Their reflex influence on society has been beneficial. The more the intellectual activities have entered, the greater has been the conquest of nature on the part of society, the more frequent have been the discoveries which have promoted life, and the more elaborate and perfected the organized collective agencies by which results could be attained. Con-

tinued social evolution is assured only by making the intellectual factor of constantly greater dependence on the part of the masses of persons. In consequence of development, the esthetic and intellectual factors have received a larger maturity, and have come to the position of existing as ends rather than as means. A constantly larger number of persons who labor for their support devote a larger portion of leisure to intellectual and esthetic enjoyment.

Race Stock

It is affirmed by ethnologists, anthropologists, and other scientists that race has a considerable bearing on social evolution. To what degree it is an influential factor has not been determined accurately. Thus it is stated that some of the characteristics of the Negro race are truly hereditary and peculiar to that people as a separate race. But in studying the position of the Negroes in the United States it is not easy to determine how much of the so-called race characteristics are not the product of the conditions under which the Negroes have lived. We find that, even in northern communities, where the Negro is, theoretically, supposed to be given the largest opportunities and to be socially equal to the whites, this is not the case. Race prejudice operates against them constantly, they are crowded into the most backward districts of



cities, and permitted to pursue only the most menial occupations. Further, their women are usually considered the legitimate prey of unscrupulous whites. Recently emerging out of slavery, having never had equal opportunities in education and culture with the whites, it is unsafe to pronounce any particular quality which they manifest the entire result of racial or biological inheritance.

At the present time there is a growing school of scientific students of anthropology and of social evolution generally that holds that the psychical differences the different groups of peoples and the various grades of society present are more the result of the special social conditions in each case than of inherent constitution. It is believed that the bodily and brain structure of men have changed little since very remote times in the evolution of the race. This means that the potency of mind is ever present to manifest itself, given the suitable conditions. As a consequence, it follows that the backward races, if placed under civilized conditions in such manner that those influences could stimulate and mould the individuals of those races from earliest infancy as they do the young of the advanced races, would make a response which would be fairly comparable to those of civilized men.

Without dogmatizing concerning the previous statement, it may be held, with fairness, that if

we consider a race as comprising both the hereditary and cultural features of a given people, the statement that race is a determining factor in social evolution is undoubtedly true. In removing a group of individuals from a people presenting backward characteristics, into the midst of a more highly developed people, both the physical and cultural, or folkway, factors operate toward the manifestation of results quite distinct from those shown by the inferior. These are doubtless the important factors relative to race in its bearing on social evolution. A people, distinguished by backwardness, develop their social life but slowly; whereas a people, advanced in culture, find little difficulty, as compared with the former, in making changes for the better.

Stage of Culture

That the stage of culture a given society occupies has much to do with its power of development, needs little exposition in the light of what has just been said and of what is commonly known. It is a determining factor in two respects at least, namely, of the rate at which change is made and of the direction or kind of transformation. By culture, it will be understood, is meant the entire social content of a given stage of social evolution; that is, ideas of every kind, modes of organization and of adjust-

ment, customs, conventions, occupational activities, beliefs, educational devices, and so on.

To perceive the force of the cultural stage of development on the power or rate of change, it is sufficient to compare the lowest type we know, such as the Fuegians, with an advanced type, such as the New Zealand. The former people has only a slight development; its cultural content is very meager. It has undoubtedly occupied about the same stage of advancement for thousands of years with scarcely perceptible change. Left to itself, many thousands of years must elapse before it could grow into civilization. The New Zealanders, on the other hand, are a young people. But in a few generations they have established and wrought out one of the most advanced and well-adjusted societies extant. The ease and celerity with which they undertake and carry through transforming enterprises is in striking contrast with the sluggishness of the Fuegians.

The direction or kind of changes which lower and higher groups introduce are markedly different. In the case of the former such changes are likely to pertain to incidental matters, to affect but a narrow range of interests, and to be conducted for the benefit of a privileged few. The higher a society is developed, the greater is the tendency to undertake the reconstruction in fundamental matters, to project transformations

which are general in nature, and to bring about changes which promote the welfare of the masses of the citizenship.

Nature of External Social Groups

External and neighboring social groups are influential factors in determining the course of development of any given society. According to Oppenheimer and other European sociologists, the state arose out of the exploitation of one group by a neighboring group. The group most susceptible of this exploitation was one made up of peasants. They were sedentary, occupied with cultivating the soil, unarmed, and peaceably disposed. A pastoral people were likely to be the exploiters. They were roving, could move expeditiously by horse, bore arms, and craved the enjoyment of other men's labor power. In each case the life of each society was changed. The existence of the peasant society, as a society, might be ended; that of the pastoral society was influenced in the direction of a ruling, tribute-gathering, militant class.

In the case of advanced nations, contact with other groups changes the course of a nation's development in many ways. With favorable conditions great industries may be developed, as in the case of England; extensive agricultural production be engaged in for the markets of the world, as in the United States until recently; or

some other line of interest promoted. The militant attitude of surrounding groups, or even of one powerful neighbor, leads an accessible nation in the direction of militancy. European nations have stimulated each other and are now influencing America to maintain larger armies, to maintain greater fleets, and to create more powerful armaments than would have been the case had all those nations followed pacific aims. In turn this preparation for war has modified government, education, manufacture, and the aspirations of the various peoples.

By presenting limitations to the dispersion of populations and to the expansion of any given people, external groups serve to throw the nation back upon itself, to develop its own resources more extensively, and frequently to tempt it to a trial of supremacy. The intensiveness of the life of the German people during recent decades has come about largely because of the pressure of surrounding nations. This has helped to arouse a vigorous national consciousness, and to set to work agencies for emancipation from the supposed encroachment and dominance of other peoples.

mental points to animal organisms. Yet under such powerful teaching sociology for a long time was inclined to describe society as if it were a biological fact.

In a large and true sense society is an organism, just as is the universe, the solar system, a system of thought, or a locomotive. In this larger, philosophical meaning anything is an organism which possesses a unity dependent on the interdependent coöperation of all the parts in the production of its movements and functions. Thus the function of the watch is to keep time, and this function is the product of all the parts of the watch working together. The function of a human body is to maintain life, and this object is attained by means of the coöperative activity of the interrelated organs of the body. Since society is an association of individuals, who get along together by working for results through the numerous social organizations, it possesses a similar interdependence of functioning parts and an organic unity.

The chief criticism of the organic concept is that it has been so used as to obscure some of the more important features of society. If society were an organism in the sense that a tree or an animal are organisms, then human beings would be as fast and fixed in the meshes of the parts and organs as are the cells in those structures. Consequently, human intervention

could have little or no effect in directing collective affairs. We would be bound in a mechanism which works automatically and unsympathetically. If this were the truth, we, of course, should accept it. But the teachings of sociologists since the time of Spencer and Lilienfeld have minimized the relative importance of the biological characteristics, and have properly emphasized the psychical qualities of social organizations and interactions. A mere mention of two or three prominent theories which have been developed during the past twenty-five years will serve to show this.

*Theories Expressing the Psychical Nature
of Society*

A notable theory is that of the late Lester F. Ward. It may be called the "achievement" theory, because in Ward's conception society consists of achievements. Achievements are intellectual products—devices, ways, means of getting things done. Machines, books, laws, social organizations and institutions, sciences, mathematical systems, etc., are achievements. Before the time of such agencies there was no society. Society arose with their appearance and has developed in proportion to their increase. Since achievements are the ideas or principles which are implicit in machines, institutions, and the like (but are not the material or visible

structures), and since they afford coöperative avenues for the larger life of men, they, rather than men or institutions visible, constitute society. If this is so, then society is a psychical, immaterial, system. Society, therefore, according to this theory, consists of the principles which represent these intellectual products as they reside in the minds of men. The continuity of society is then dependent on the perpetual transfer of these ideas from generation to generation. Human beings are necessary to this system only in the sense that achievements are created in or conserved by the minds of men.

The "imitation" theory is another interesting and important sociological theory. Tarde in France and Baldwin in America have been the leading exponents of the imitation concept. For sociological purposes, imitation may be stated as the inborn psychical tendency of human beings to follow the example of others. Animals do this generally, monkeys are adepts at it, the word "aping" was derived from the actions of apes, and, consequently, man came by imitation naturally. The child begins to follow suggestions quite early in its career. It learns first by following the examples of its immediate family, then of those of the neighborhood, later takes suggestions from or imitates the ideas of others in school, and thus evolves to a grasp of the larger world. All of the earlier life of the individual

is made up of imitation. Actual, original creation is nil. Only a few able individuals ever develop creative power and introduce variation into the social world. Most individuals absorb the copies set by others without modification. Consequently, the new generation becomes like the old, all the men of a community come to hold essentially the same ideas, beliefs, and customs, and society is continuous, because the parents and elders transfer their ideas to the children and youth. Since what is thus handed down consists of ideas and ideas of ways to do things, it is obvious that, according to this theory, society is a psychological fact.

A third influential theory is the "interest" theory. This is held by Ratzenhofer of Germany and by Small of America. According to this conception we see men in primitive times developing a variety of wants. The farther they develop, the more wants they have. Each want calls out an interest in getting the want supplied. Organizations or social structures to get these interests realized arise. Men of like interests group together more or less permanently. Organizations appear as fast as distinct interests evolve. Growing, multiplying interests and wants ordain an expanding and more enduring social structure. In so far as men of one group or structure want something which the men of another or other groups desire, conflict arises. The stronger

groups obtain what they want by subordinating other groups to themselves. By this means we have the appearance of classes and castes. The larger society, in the form of the state, which, as we saw, arose as an exploiting agency, seeks to reconcile the interests of the antithetical groups. Of course, the customs and traditions of each group are factors to support the interests of the given groups. In so far as there is custom and tradition which is common to all the groups constituting the larger society, such as a nation, these are reconciling agencies.

Again we have a theory that has psychological import. Wants and interests are psychical affairs. The organizations and agencies instituted for their satisfaction are also products of the mental faculties, and are consequently of a psychical nature. Social continuity is provided for in the transfer of interests as permanent group assets from generation to generation. Coöperation among persons of like interests is a group amalgam, and frequently an inter-group bond, since members of different groups may differ about one matter and agree on many.

Conclusion

Other interesting theories exist, such as the "folkway" theory of the late Professor Sumner, Giddings' theory of "consciousness of kind," the "synthetic" theory of Ellwood, the "social

control" idea of Ross, and others. All of them agree with the former theories in being psychological in nature. It may be definitely stated, in view of present sociological theories as to the nature of society, that human society is to be viewed as a system of men who are bound together by psychical bonds, and who function together by means of psychological organizations. Men's bodies do not constitute society, although they are essential conditions for its existence and furnish primary reasons why it does exist. A sleeping army would not be a society or a social group. It would not be an organization; only so many sleeping individuals. Let the bugles blow and the drums beat the signal of alarm or attack, the army becomes conscious, takes on organization, moves as a corporate entity. The organizing, synthesizing factor is the presence of conscious awareness and purposiveness. Instead of the army, suppose as many men who happened to wander to the same place and to lie asleep. Now, should an alarm be sounded, in place of organized movement there is consternation and bewildered flight. The minds of the men there may be as able as those of the soldiers, but they have no plan. Each individual is a unit and acts on his individual impulse. Instead of concerted movement there is pandemonium and interference. Thus the organization we know as an army is a coöpera-

tive undertaking and discipline, the condition of which is the habit of mind and knowledge of proper technical operations that are embedded in the minds of all constituent members. The army as organization, as a social fact, is the psychic factor.

What is true of the illustration just used is equally true of any other organization or associational event. While people are necessary for the existence of society, it is possible that under certain conditions people may exist and there be no society. Let all the persons of a city or a state be in a condition of coma at one time, and city or state as a social fact does not exist. Even in the matter of custom and convention, which appear to carry themselves forward, the conscious element is demanded. To eat with fork rather than with knife, to wear an evening suit after six in the evening instead of before dinner, or to leave two cards for the gentlemen and one for the lady caller, are items, the correct execution of which depends on mental alertness and comprehension of a plan of action. If it is said that it is the emotional element that unifies mankind and binds men together, in the first place it is to be remembered that emotions are psychical, and, in the second, that unless emotions are guided by ideas they are blind. Again, such conditions as physical environment and economic situations operate to secure unity among men

and coöperative action only as they are apprehended by the minds of the individuals concerned. Their significance must be recognized or they are impotent.

CHAPTER VII

THE SOCIAL ORDER

SOcial phenomena and human associations have an arrangement which it is proper to term the social order. Social order and social organization are closely synonymous phrases. What is meant is that there is an established relationship in the arrangement of institutions, customs, beliefs, ideas, modes of procedure, and all else that makes up the content of society. The existing relationships are regular, persistent, and definite to that degree which is in harmony with the nature of an aggregate that is constituted of volitional elements such as human beings.

Evidence of a Social Order

Occasionally there is a doubting Thomas who questions the existence of a societal order, at least to the extent that it is a realm of law and principles. The doubt is usually fathered by the thought that an established order which is the domain of law contradicts the assumption that men are free moral agents. Therefore such an order does not exist. Similarly, hundreds of years ago, the heliocentric theory of the planetary system was scouted as inconsistent with the testi-

mony of the senses and the Bible. Consequently, such a theory was pilloried and executed. But the treatment did not change the truth which is now commonly accepted. The theory of evolution has received like treatment, but modern science has builded its structure on the foundations of that theory. To discard evolution is to reject the fruitful part of science.

The intelligent man needs no proof of the existence of an established order of human associations. The everyday man takes it for granted, and the question of its existence does not arise in his mind. But for those who require proof, as well as for scientific reasons, some evidences may be suggested.

First, all men act as if they believed in such a system. They initiate courses of action which cover years to execute, make business ventures which depend on the regular occurrence of events, anticipate future conditions in many ways, and in general bank on the continuance of things just about as they are. Since they do this because the experience of previous men and of their own, the proof is of a high order of competence.

Second, our knowledge of human nature makes us treat men as if we believed that they act regularly and according to system. Men have written treatises on "the moral order of the world" in spite of the fact that they believed in freedom of

the will. Archbishop Whately wrote that we steadfastly believe that men will do so and so according to their character, and that in case they fail to do as we anticipated, we lay it, not to the lack of order in men's actions, but to our deficiency of knowledge of their character.

Third, a great array of statistical facts proves that human events occur according to system. We estimate populations of cities and states for some years ahead and find that the estimates are approximately true. Even volitional matters like marriage and divorce occur with great regularity. It can be predicted with a large degree of certainty what per cent of persons of any given-age group in the United States will be married ten years hence. Actuaries make life tables, and insurance is written on their basis. For given nations the divorce rate can be safely estimated in advance. Taking into account the incomes of a group, it can be foretold what per cent of the income will be spent for clothing, light and heat, food, house rent, medicine, investment, etc.

Causes of the Order

Conceding that there is a social order, we may ask what has produced it. First, that which is really external to society, but which is the great moulding influence, the uniformity of physical conditions and processes, profoundly makes for order. Men have to adjust themselves to nature

according to the prescriptions imposed by nature. Fortunately for men, nature is very dependable. She seldom does the unexpected. When she does indulge in eccentricities, such as furnishing earthquakes, tornadoes, and droughts, the human order is disturbed. The climates of the respective zones and areas do not change perceptibly, seasons occur with almost perfect regularity, precipitation is dependable, the nature of plants and animals together with their responses are fixed. Consequently, collective man has built his social order to fit the functioning of nature, and much of the steadfastness of that order is due to the uniformity in natural phenomena.

Second, as was suggested above, human nature contains factors which make for uniformity. The more influential ones are instincts, habits, and ideals of action. Man, in common with animals, is fitted up with an automatic equipment which primarily accounts for much of his conduct. All of the early activities of the child are the outcome of instincts. The foundations of the whole emotional life are instinctive. Hunger, love, anger, revenge, jealousy, sympathy, fear, the manifestations of which possess an intense emotional tone, are the roots of the larger portion of social action. Given the conditions, and most of these instincts operate immediately. All of them may be modified and checked to a greater or less degree. Hunger, and love of the sexual kind,

occur at stated intervals or at a given period of the individual's development. Now the fact that all men have them, and that they act spontaneously under appropriate conditions, serves to create uniformity of action among men who are in contact.

Habits are the near cousins of instincts. But they are formed during the individual's lifetime, while instincts are innate. Instincts have been moulded, for most part, by the physical conditions which have surrounded animal life. Habits also arise in response to those factors, but the social conditions which surround individuals during the more advanced stages of society play a larger part in their production. In so far as men live under similar conditions they develop like habits and habitual modes of response. And considering the facts of uniformity of nature, of instinctive modes of response, and of the associational life which has developed as a consequence, it is seen that there is a large similarity in the various situations in which individuals are reared. As a consequence, the responses which are made as men carry on the collective life are largely of one pattern. Hence arise the folkways, or customs, the conventions, bodies of belief, systems of teaching and of science, methods of carrying on the work of the world, and all the other agencies of relating individuals and of securing coöperation. It eventuates that in any

given period of a community's life these habitual responses organize themselves into a social order which is as stable and regular as is human nature.

Third, ideals for community life likewise bring about a solidarity. This may not be true in their initial stage, but it obtains when such ideals become widely accepted. It is true that in a static society these ideals possess a characteristic akin to the habitual. But in a changing society they point toward such a transformation that society will be bettered. When these ideals have become generally accepted they operate to move society forward gradually toward a new stage of development. But because the change is a gradual one, the characteristics of order and system are maintained during the transformations which ensue. A progressive society is one in which such changes constantly occur under the influence of ideals, and the social order is a moving yet stable order.

Fourth, social order is partly determined by existing methods of social control. These methods are either conscious or unconscious, relative to the outcome. All of the cultural activities, in so far as they have a bearing on the social system, either disturb or the more firmly establish the order which is in vogue. Since most of those activities are conventional, they serve to retain rather than change the prevailing system. Certain agitations and teachings are in-

tended to have a reformatory effect on society. Carried on by considerable groups or parties, they are conscious attempts at effecting change. Historically, the most considerable of the conscious attempts to maintain the social order at any given time have been made by ruling classes. Before the French Revolution the "two estates" constituted a ruling order in France which was a class-conscious régime. Practically all of the greater nations of Europe have such classes who seek to maintain the established order. Perhaps a growing number of citizens of the United States believe this nation is dominated by the wealthy classes acting together somewhat consciously. In all these cases the ruling classes desire that the social and economic arrangements which obtain and which are favorable to their interests shall not be disturbed. Having great influence, they are able to prevent a rapid or decided transformation of the order they sanction.

Social Organization and Social Order

By some, the phrase "social organization" is meant to imply what has above been covered by the social order. By others it is thought of rather as pertaining to the system of articulating the larger and more active interests of society. We may think of it here as the social order made more explicit.

When we think of society somewhat explicitly,

we find that it largely consists of structural organizations which are somehow bound into a great whole, and that each of those structures represents an important interest which it is its business to realize. Some of the more important interests about which organizations have grown were indicated and outlined in Chapter II.

The more thoughtful men are, the more they see that society is a definite organization of structures whose function is the realization of their respective interests. Looking back on the evolution of society, it is apparent that the interests are the parents of the structures. That does not mean that the functions arose before the organizations, but that the wants or vision of new demands made themselves felt and the new structures were developed to meet those wants. As rapidly as the organization was evolved the function was performed. This sequence constantly recurs. Men are discovering new needs and, consequently, creating the social agencies by which they may be met. Thus, recently, people have come to believe that community recreation is desirable, and many communities are establishing agencies known as playground or recreation centers.

It might be supposed that since these interests grew up together there is no problem of reconciliation and coördination. Society consists of the balancing of all of these interests, but the

act of balancing is not without conflict and disturbance. It cannot be assumed that just because they do make up a totality, an integral society, the whole moves forward or rests with entire peace within the collective structure. Conflict of interests in society is almost as common as concord. Capital against labor, peace against militarism, religious sect against sect, political party against political party, labor group against labor group, business against business, and community jealousies and divisions are a few of the symptoms of the warring of interests.

One of the great reconciling forces exists in the fact that each man represents several interests. He has political, religious, educational, recreational, domestic, and all the other interests. Consequently, he is bound up with others who have like diversity of interests. On some of these interests individuals agree, and on some disagree. A man coöperates with his neighbor in some directions, opposes him in others. His neighbor and all other citizens are situated in like manner. Hence society cannot fall apart in sections.

In the long run the more powerful interests prevail, and society is the resultant of the most powerful forces of the period. At one time the ecclesiastical organization was the dominating agency, but it has fallen into the background. The modern state is the great regulating agency

of all the forceful interests. Every serious problem must ultimately be acted upon and settled by the state. The state itself is an agency which is influenced by the powerful interests. The stronger interests place their representatives in power and gain a preponderating voice in the decision of matters.

Changing the Social Order


If social evolution and progress have occurred, and no one can doubt that, at least, evolution of society has taken place, it is inevitable that the social order must have undergone a transformation. It is needless, therefore, to discuss the possibility of such a change. Also, the discussion thus far has suggested the causes of social changes in general. Without seeking to be exhaustive, certain methods of changing the social order may be mentioned briefly.

Advancement in culture in its educative sense must have a profound influence. New discoveries in all fields of effort, mechanical inventions which influence all phases of life, the improvement of social devices of all kinds, are the result of the heightening of culture. In their turn they stimulate and produce transformations in the various organizations and in their articulation into a social whole. Changes in society which are due to heightening culture most frequently take place quietly. But they may sometimes work them-

selves out in a brief time. In this case they are catastrophic and are termed social revolutions. By the peaceful method social structures are changed gradually and the totality is little disturbed. By the revolutionary method some of the structures are eliminated or badly shattered. As a consequence, the society goes through a period of reconstruction in a more or less crippled condition. The old structures may be brought in later, or new ones built to replace them. The French Revolution changed the political structure of the French nation fundamentally, and introduced transformations in other directions. The Industrial Revolution substituted new producing agencies, which in turn brought about swift changes in social conditions generally.

After fundamental changes have been introduced and society has righted itself, the new comes to be accepted as the established scheme of life, and a "new social order" is said to exist. All phases of life become conventionalized after men follow the same methods of reaction for a time, and custom, with its petrifying grip, settles down upon the societal processes. When once accustomed to the changed régime, men's minds become fixed by habit and resent suggestions of readjustment in the order, just as was done in the case of the previous order.

It is sometimes stated that the economic fac-



tors are more responsible for introducing changes in the social order than are other agencies. No doubt, in a general sense, this is correct. But the final analysis indicates that economic factors, in the proper meaning, are themselves the products of the scientific insight and largeness of vision which are the outcome of the general cultural system. The ultimate factors of change in society, therefore, are the intellectual desires which seek to bring new truths to light. The men who are devoted to science in the quest of truth are the real motive forces of social transformation.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SOCIAL MIND

IN the literature of sociology, and sometimes in current writings of an intellectual cast, certain expressions are met which suggest the psychical characteristics of society. The "social mind," "social consciousness," "public opinion," and "public will" are examples. These phrases do not connote exactly the same meaning, indeed, but they do suggest a collective psychical solidarity. While the whole of society is psychical and all of its phenomena must be regarded as psychical manifestations, it is necessary to consider society under certain of its aspects as the social mind.

What It Is

To the average individual the social mind manifests itself through the medium of his awareness of or sensitiveness to a comprehensive, enveloping publicity. Nothing very definite or tangible appears to impinge, but "What they will say?" has the note of decided reality. The sentiment of the community concerning the proposed action, the public opinion it may arouse, the moral sense it may evoke, are factors which every normal

person respects, although their exact scientific nature may never have been suspected by him. It is the respect for and fear of the public mind which keeps most of us good.

The social mind sometimes manifests itself in a spectacular manner as a symptom of mob-mindedness. At times, indeed, a mob forms deliberately, with little excitement, but commonly it is a spontaneous, emotional affair and individuals are swept into its vortex by a strong wave of feeling. Under those conditions the critical faculties are passive, the habit and ability to judge of the morality and expediency of the course of action sink into abeyance, and the members of the active group are dominated by the collective mind.


Symptoms of mob-mindedness evince themselves also over large areas and populations. A horrible catastrophe rivets the attention of millions, throws the larger public into a common emotional attitude, and elicits a unified course of action or of expression. The shelling of a Fort Sumter, the blowing up of the *Maine*, the sinking of the *Lusitania* create currents of sentiment which surge through great masses of population and make human beings respond as water drops acted upon by ocean swells.

There is a social consciousness of a more rational quality which embraces the minds of practically all the citizens of the nation. A unity

of thought and feeling exists among all citizens relative to the nation, to the principles it envisages, to the flag, and to kindred ideas. In addition, it would be remarkably easy to convert that oneness of thought and feeling into united action, should occasion arise. It is quite impossible that the uncritically minded man should place himself outside the sweep and influence of this larger psychical atmosphere. Such mental unity goes far to explain the persistence and stability of national life.

Social consciousness expresses itself in a number of forms. It may be truer to say that there are many social consciousnesses. Our national life is made up of different publics or group minds. Thus we have great political parties with their platforms and policies. These parties are composed of members who believe alike and hold together for political action on the basis of their common beliefs. We have the labor group and the capital group, the members of each group agreeing on certain fundamental matters and striving to realize their doctrines. There are religious publics, literary publics, publics founded on scientific beliefs. Foist a choice idea from any of these publics on public attention and citizens array themselves in conscious groups according to their attitude to the idea.

A paradox exists relative to the social mind and individual minds. The former is but the



organic agreement of the latter, and the latter is the product of the former. There is no social mind, no separate, transcendental, collective entity in the form of a social consciousness, above and apart from individual minds. Unless men fundamentally agree so that coöperative results are obtainable, there can be no society and no social mind. But this ability to agree, the thinking and feeling alike, are the outcome of individuals being nurtured and cultured in the atmosphere of group association and solidarity. The sociologist is more certain of nothing than that individual mind and human personality are the gradually formed accretions and resultants of the age-old social evolution. Thus the agreement among minds is not of the accidental and superficial order. It is founded in the constitution both of society and the individual.

What Makes It Possible

Since the social mind is the oneness of sentiment, thought, and tendency to reaction which prevails among men generally, it must have determining conditions. It is something inter-individual and requires support. The contact and interplay of mind with mind we take as a matter of course as we do the air. Minds and society have developed together, and the apparatus and conditions needful to their expansion have also been an evolution.

The ability to catch suggestions from the movements and physical expressions of other individuals, and the tendency to imitate and respond to favored actions, doubtless were the original foundation factors. These are preconditions of a communicating system, and without them we do not see how such a system could be established. All the higher animals have those abilities and tendencies. We need not concern ourselves with how they began, except to say that the rearing of families furnished beginning groups, and heredity favored those animals which made most out of communication. But a communicating system is absolutely essential to the existence of a social mind.

In an early chapter we noticed the rise of language. This has formed the nexus between minds and furnished the channel for the flow of currents of ideas. Whatever has perfected or extended this connecting agency has facilitated the exchange of thought and helped build up a social consciousness. The development of the parts of speech, the establishment of sign language, the working out of picture writing, the creation of an alphabet, of running script, of permanent writing material, the invention of printing and the popularization of information, the founding of schools for the training of minds and the spread of more exact knowledge, the introduction of newspaper, library, telegraph,

telephone, radiotelegraphy, the invention and adoption of rapid transporting devices so that mail and published matter may reach their destination speedily, have widened the reach of communication and expanded the area of the operation of social consciousness.

Besides the development of a communicating system, some other growths have favored the establishment of a social mind. Among these may be mentioned maxims, judgments, training habits, and the like. It is one of the functions of language to fix meanings. An idea comes to be expressed by a certain word. That idea is fixed in the word. All who use the word approximate the same meaning. In the same manner, a maxim or a judgment play large parts in fixing and continuing ideas. Maxims are especially effective because they express, in popular and picturesque form, certain popular judgments which have been worked out by long experience. "A rolling stone gathers no moss," is the popular verdict on the unfruitfulness of the man who jumps from job to job. Such judgments, those which serve to reflect a community attitude or to teach virtues which are useful for community purposes, fixate minds in a common form and promote a larger consensus of opinion.

Habits of training, in so far as they are similar for different families and communities, exert a strong influence toward producing a common

consciousness. Where all the children are brought up in the same way and to believe the same things, there should be little divergence of views and of action when they are called on to conduct affairs. This is a vital matter relative to the greater issues and questions, where the point of view determines what the ultimate course of action by the community or nation shall be. Thus, the family point of view relative to the Negro and the Negro question is likely to determine the individual's lifelong attitude toward the Negro race. It is largely by this means that the public mind in the North and the South relative to the Negro has come to be different. But in smaller matters, such as modes of eating, dressing, and appearing in public, similarities and differences of habit have considerable import. Racial disagreements are likely to hinge quite as much on these things as on what are considered more weighty. Racial consciousness is a form of social consciousness which plays a serious part in the affairs of men. It is chiefly made up of prejudices, and these prejudices in turn are based very largely on such superficial differences between racial groups as complexion, form of hair, modes of living, of eating, of dressing, and the like.

Its Coercive and Evaluating Aspects

The social mind is both a coercing and evaluating agency. It is said that violators of the laws

of the United States have a great fear of the national government because of its wide reach and profound authority. But there is a force that is more feared than that of the central government, one without the existence of which the central authority would be of little avail. This is the social mind which manifests itself in a national sentiment or opinion relative to a given act or issue. However powerful combinations of capital may be, they have slight respect for national laws until those laws are backed up by a strong publicity and general sentiment. The fact that the most powerful corporations are now seeking, by various means, to direct and mould public opinion relative to themselves, is an index of their perception of the force of the sentiment in a democracy. Could this opinion be influenced in a direction opposed to its present course, current national laws regulative of corporate powers might be forced from the statute books. Probably the crucial test of democracy lies in its ability to keep open its publicity channels.

Unless publicity is directed toward some particular issue or action, the social mind possesses no coercive power. This is the reason so many laws which are good are not enforced. They were enacted before there was a general sentiment created in their behalf, or they have long existed and the public has forgotten them. Every

law and community regulation is dependent for its effectiveness on the support of the wide-awake sentiment of the society involved.

In matters of right and wrong, of what is commonly called morality, the social mind acts as the largest compelling agent. Our ideas of what is right and ethical are either purely formal, which means that they have been accepted from a distant past in which they were probably formed under the lead of public sentiment, or they are highly conscious and active. Save for the cases of original thinkers who dare follow their reason and blaze the way to new positions of thought and conduct, the consciences of men are incited only by an aroused community consciousness. Leadership and "respectability" are prominent factors in getting a consciousness aroused. When the average man discovers that the "respectable" citizens of a community, or that a large number of persons, favor a course of action, he is impressed and accepts "reasons" which he previously repelled. After enough individuals accept the new position to make it formidable it may become generally sanctioned. Then it is right and the opposite is wrong. All follow the new course of action as a matter of course because of the fear of community disapproval if they do not. For the same reason anti-social man often is restrained from anti-social actions because of the dread of exposure.

During the "insurance scandal" of a few years ago, certain high officers of insurance companies who had engaged in nefarious practices and yet had posed as public benefactors, withered like blighted leaves before the public disapproval which followed the exposure, and in some cases died of shame. The fear of what people will think and say, the reverence for the community sentiment, is so strong in all, that it may be said that most of the force of conscience is vested in public opinion.

Such considerations introduce the idea of the evaluating function which resides in the social mind. Every active social mind, every new incitement which the social consciousness experiences, involves the process of setting and fixing values. If a course of action is right, it is right because society in the past has so determined it. When a new course of action opens up before men, one the ethical nature of which has not been determined, except when the evils to society are very apparent, they are left free to follow it. But if injurious social results appear, the public's attention is directed to the new situation. After due consideration, if the evils are found to be considerable, the new form of activity is proscribed or so modified as to be harmless. Social consciousness has placed a valuation on it, has pronounced an ethical judgment, and has set up the norm which its members are to respect.

direction by means of its own agency, it follows that it may also be influenced by other agencies. Every considerable organized body of opinion that actively exerts its influence toward shaping the mind of the public has its due effect. Since many organizations have for their specific aim the moulding of minds, and many others seek to do so on particular occasions, it is obvious that the social mind must bear the imprint of their efforts. Instead of "making itself up" it is being made up. Consequently, it is the composite of all the influences at work on it. Only in so far as the people in general arrive at a thorough understanding of society and what affects its welfare for evil, can the social mind be rendered immune to the effects of pernicious influences.



CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL SELECTION

AFTER observing the clash of interests that seem to pervade society in almost every quarter, there is a temptation to conclude that all society is conflict and that the struggle for existence is as dominant in human society now as it is among animals in the jungle. The temptation is all the greater if the observer dwells in historic Europe, where races and peoples entertain for each other such bitter animosity because they have fought with one another for ages. On the other hand, there is a tendency in some quarters to regard the collective life as a pacific process and to think of human beings as lifted above the plane of conflict. Both of these positions are extreme, and the truth lies somewhere between the two conceptions.

Society and Natural Selection

We may admit that biological principles have a large measure of application to society and to individuals in their organized capacity without having to infer that men are dominated by those principles to the exclusion of all others. There is a close analogy between the relation of the

social to the biological processes, and that of the biological to the physical and chemical. The opinion is often ventured that the life processes of human bodies and other organisms can be reduced to chemical terms. But no extended proofs exist that this is possible. The organic, synthetic element present, especially in the higher organisms, has completely eluded the attempts of the present experimenters to reduce it to chemical terms. Likewise, while we must acknowledge that social existence rests on biological foundations, it is apparent that society is non-biological and that the mutual-aid factor cannot be analyzed into biological elements. Instead, therefore, of seeking to account for the facts of society on the grounds of natural selection, the sociologist must make use of a principle that was introduced later into the evolutionary process. Because any given societal phenomenon is the result of the conditions at work in society, we may think of the new principle as social selection. Just as, in a state of nature, natural selection includes all of the factors which determine what plant and animal forms shall survive, so, under a collective régime, societal selection governs the persistence of social forms and of individuals.

The essential factors in natural selection are reproduction, heredity, variation, struggle, and adaptation. All forms of life reproduce. The

tendency is to multiply rapidly, the ratio of increase varying with the species and, among animals, decreasing with the advance of evolution. By heredity the form and qualities of the parents are passed down to the progeny. This serves to establish the type and to preserve the integrity of the different varieties. But no two individuals are exactly similar. Small variations make the offspring slightly different from the parents. Should these variations prove serviceable to the organism they may recur more magnified in succeeding generations of offspring, with the result that new varieties of a superior type appear. But because organisms multiply rapidly, a region may become congested and, as a consequence, a struggle for subsistence takes place between individuals and types. Further, the physical environment will undoubtedly favor certain varieties more than others, and a process of adaptation is thus set up. The attempt to live, opposed by the other forms of life and frequently by the physical conditions, constitutes the struggle for existence. Hence it is held that evolution of the forms of life has taken place by natural selection.

The Factor of Mutuality

In the biological realm, under the conditions of natural selection, a process of adaptation is carried on in which the organisms which are

permitted to survive are said to be adjusted. The adjustment is to all the factors of the environment, involving the physical, the vegetal, and animal features. The surviving organism conforms to the physical and devours or crowds out other biological organisms.

Now, the import of a collective mode of life is that the force of natural selection is modified, for the very essence of society is mutuality. As fast as society was evolved, the biological method of physical dominance and deadly struggle between individual organisms was mollified and mitigated by the interjection of an attitude of conciliation and a spirit of coöperation. In place of individual seeking to exterminate every other individual, groups of individuals acting together faced the common enemy and constructively reacted on the soil and plant life. While it is impossible to discover a nature that is absolutely "red in tooth and claw," large sections are undoubtedly lacking in the mutual factor. However, the element of mutual aid is clearly visible among most of the higher animals, and it is clear that, among them, for the process of "struggle to the death" between individuals has been substituted in part one of group existence and competition.

The larger the scope and the higher the development of the social group, other things equal, the greater the amelioration of the existence of


the members constituting it. The rule of might within the group was checked by sentiments of affection and esteem. Brute strength gave way to the appeals of gentleness and humanity. Thus the appearance of society involved the use of the new principle of social selection. This did not in the beginning displace natural selection, nor has it ever entirely done so. The factors of natural selection still operate, although not in their former complete and exclusive manner. Often the processes of heredity, variation, multiplication, competition, and adaptation are visible.

Modern society is assuming a very positive attitude towards certain of the factors of natural selection. It is seeking to make use of heredity and variation for the improvement of the race stock. By preventing the occurrence of defective persons it endeavors to build a better physical and mental type. In the evolution of its standards of living and of aspirations it has placed a check on the rapid multiplication of the stock. The improvements in the construction of buildings, in methods of heating and ventilation, in matters of sanitation, and in wearing apparel have rendered practically all portions of the earth habitable, robbed the deadly zones of their power to penalize, and given man a greater power of adaptation to conditions.

Besides these mitigating tendencies, society has worked out a large exemption of certain classes

from the immediate and extreme results of the former inevitable struggle. Among animals there was little or no leniency shown the unfortunate members. The disabled, the feeble, the mentally deranged, the sick, the old, were left to their fate. Among many groups of present primitive men only a little less "brutality" is manifested. Weak infants are exposed in order that they may be eliminated; the old are killed or left to die; the insane, idiotic, and sick are treated as possessed of evil spirits, or abandoned. Society has wrought a revolution in these respects. The more delicate the infant, the greater its care. Great efforts are made to preserve the lives of all classes of the disabled in body and mind. Society maintains munificent institutions for the preservation of its derelicts who in a primitive age would have been exterminated by nature. Further, the offspring of civilized peoples are guarded from danger and stress in many ways. Those of the wealthy may never have to put forth the least effort for their subsistence or toward being useful.

Not only has the establishment of collective life mitigated existence, it has enhanced it. The establishment of coöperative effort in numerous directions has expanded life. Production of the goods to satisfy wants has been improved so that there is a greater assurance of existence and a larger range of satisfaction and realization.



Higher interests and wants have been developed and mutuality has secured their appeasement.

The Method of Social Selection

The method of natural selection is brute struggle, the competition of might or of cunning. That of social selection has been and is now such struggle plus the mutual element of coöperative assistance. The ideal society is one in which the purely selfish element, the desire to exploit others, disappears, and the desire to afford each human being the opportunity to develop his talents to the fullest prevails. While we are far removed from that ideal society, it is pretty apparent that our development is in that direction. When that stage is reached social selection will be wholly a mutual, reciprocal process. Now it is a synthesis of might, cunning, and mutuality. But because social selection involves factors not included in natural selection it is thereby rendered different and is constituted a higher synthetic process.

The competitive element which obtains among men is partly based on inherent biological factors. Thus when two men compete for position or wealth, the outcome is determined by their comparative capacity and ability, capacity representing heredity, and ability the influence of training. Health, strength, temperament, and capacity are general conditions of social selection.

The struggle process in society has undergone a transformation in the course of social evolution. It has become less an affair of physical strength. Whether it takes place between individuals or groups, conflict today rests on intellectual prowess more than formerly. Cunning, shrewdness, indirection, sheer mental power, are important factors in determining the outcome. It has also become more largely an affair of groups than of individuals. Within a given group or organization, individuals may compete for place. Yet standardization of processes has done much to eliminate this kind of conflict. But between rival group interests, whether industrial, political, sectarian, or "social," the competition is often intense. Besides this, there is a conflict between classes, often of a strained and bitter character.

Still another change has been to create a clash between the individual and the system. Unless he is a member of an influential class or organization, the destiny of the individual is determined by the industrial system. Treated as an incident, as a pawn in the process of business, having the fate of self and family decided without consultation or recourse, the individual frequently sets himself against the cosmic pressure of the social system which restrains him.

Because of the conflict of great interests, the attempt of vast industrial systems to subordinate

the larger welfare to their own ends, as well as because of the appearance of other phenomena which menace the general interest that society represents, there is a demand for a stricter and larger social control. The attitude of mind is rapidly developing which calls for the extension of the functions of the only agency which has the power to coördinate conflicting elements and the neutrality to fairly represent all interests. As a consequence, state control and supervision of industrial processes and conditions of life generally has been greatly extended. Thus is being wrought out the highest stage of social selection, that of socialization.

CHAPTER X

PROGRESS AND ITS CONDITIONS

OF the two conceptions, evolution and progress, the latter is the more important for sociology. Modern sociologists and social reformers are bound to concern themselves with the idea of progress and the instruments by which it is attained. It will be well, therefore, to consider the chief features of progress.

The Nature of Progress

It has been a common mistake to regard evolution and progress as identical concepts and processes; but progress is distinctly a sociological idea and process, peculiar to society, while evolution embraces the development alike of the universe, of celestial systems, worlds, the organic realms of animals and plants, and society. Progress is thus seen to be but a phase of the larger process of evolution. In another respect their lack of identity is obvious. Evolution involves all that takes place in any given system during the course of its existence, whether it is in the nature of advance or of retrogression. Progress cannot pertain to any process that tears down the system and results in deterioration. Consequently, only

those changes and transformations which are for the improvement of the system concerned can be rightly termed progressive.

Progress also includes the idea of well-being. The welfare of the individuals which constitute the given system of society is the great end of progress. This has been denied by some writers because in their estimation a scientific account of society has nothing to do with the subjective states of the individual. A scientific sociology, they maintain, would concern itself only with the formal process, not with what men think the process should attain. But satisfaction is an essential part of the social process, because, in part, it determines what direction the process shall take. Further, the only justification to be found for any system is in its ability to realize the human element—the well-being of man, the general welfare or contentment. Herbert Spencer believed that evolution and progress were one and the same process because evolution meant a better adjustment of life to its conditions and a better adjustment involved the subjective factor of well-being, or satisfaction. But he forgot his own teaching that evolution covers both advance and retrogression, and he overlooked the fact that a social organization in its growth may meet the criteria of evolution and yet prove oppressive. Some of the great modern trusts exemplify this statement. They have enlarged

and expanded, differentiated, and integrated, until they have stood as almost perfect examples of social organization; yet the well-being of their workers often has been disregarded and their operations have not always conduced to the larger welfare. It is objected that progress should not be treated by sociology because the idea of progress involves utility and science should avoid utilitarian aims. In reply it may be said that of all the sciences only the highest kinds of mathematics have ever been in the position of being able to disregard utility, and that for only a short time. We have no sciences that ultimately are not intended to be useful. But, in so far as it prejudices the judgment, it is justifiable to exclude a consideration of the immediately useful from pure science. However, in the long run, the only justification of any science is that of being useful.

Able writers have maintained that society is realizing progress whenever it moves away from a "pain economy" and realizes in larger measure a "pleasure economy." Animals leading a wild life live in a state of fear of death from their enemies. Every animal is destined to die of violence or starvation. The satisfaction of fundamental wants of mere existence is ever pressing. Lower human society was very little removed from this condition. With the growth of coöperative ability the invention of mechanical devices of of-

fense and defense, and the establishment of organized agencies for getting food, making the many forms of goods for satisfying wants, and of promoting life generally, the force of the pain economy waned and that of the pleasure economy strengthened. The very center of the system was the invention and adoption of devices for bringing a greater store of satisfaction to the masses of people. Hence it may be said that progress represents the better adaptation of all social agencies to the conditions of life and the consequent well-being which results from it.


Modern progress is characterized by a heightened social consciousness or is the product of collective intelligence. It would require an extended discussion to determine whether or not progress has always been the result of an active public mind. It might seem that in primitive times favorable adaptations of social agencies could have been effected without foresight on the part of the group acting as a group. Yet it is found that among such very primitive peoples as the Australians, before changes in the institutions were made, the proposals were seriously considered in a council of the leading men of the group. It is likely that, when custom and tradition were so greatly revered, as they were in primitive times, the transformation and readaptation of at least important ones must have had an authoritative sanction. Whatever may have

been the case then, it is certain that fundamental changes in modern society are either projected by some form of the state, as the representative of the given society, or, when made by other agencies, they are finally sanctioned or regulated by the collective authority. No agency can be permitted, for long, to work against the interest of society in general. The state is the guardian of the interest of the masses of its citizens, and is bound to sit in judgment on the various organizations which affect the lives of its people. Beneficent activities are sanctioned or permitted, injurious ones are prevented or modified.

Possibility of Progress

The term progress is used so widely, and what is supposed to represent progress is appreciated in terms of such unctiousness, as to force the inference that progress is universally desired. Yet nothing is further from the truth, for progress necessitates a transformation of social organization, a fundamental change in the social order. A readjustment of this nature is destined to be opposed for two reasons.

First, individuals in general are creatures of habit, and, since social readjustment signifies the breaking up of customary modes of reacting and the establishment of new ones, they may be depended on to resent innovations.



Second, every social order comprehends a privileged class as a part of its organization, and because progress in reality involves a reduction of unjust privileges it can only be dreaded and hated by that powerful section of society. In so far as it signifies disturbing privilege, progress can come only by being forced upon the privileged class; and, since it means the disturbance of custom, the masses of people must be convinced that their interests demand it before it is possible of realization.

The foregoing statement illustrates the obstacles to progress but it does not prove its possibility or impossibility. Some acute thinkers have sought to demonstrate the impossibility of progress. M. Emile Faguet believes that progress is beyond attainment because it involves the idea of continuous improvement, something he indicates we cannot demonstrate since we cannot prove that human beings as individuals possess greater knowledge, happiness, and morality than originally, and that if they do the advance has been a continuous one. It is possible to prove that scientific knowledge has increased but such knowledge does not increase happiness and morality. But while it is impossible to demonstrate progress in general, it is feasible to believe in and attain certain kinds of improvement. Progress in general cannot be attained, in his estimation, because we cannot know the goal of society, and

without this knowledge we have no means of continuous social direction.

The late sociologist Ludwig Gumplowicz developed a system in which the possibility of progress was denied. According to his teaching an increase of human misery is the inevitable result of development, and is inherent in the social process. For social evolution involves the multiplication of wants on the part of individuals and it is unlikely that continuous differentiation and multiplication will be checked. But while the privileged few control the means by which all their wants are realized, the preponderating majority of men have developed no corresponding ability of attaining such satisfaction. Indeed that ability has remained comparatively stationary in the face of increasing numbers of biting desires. And when we seek to form a judgment of future social conditions, and to ground that judgment on the course of evolution thus far realized, we find no basis of hope that the situation will be changed. Indeed, we observe the control of the means of satisfaction so firmly held by the ruling classes that its weakening is beyond rational expectation. As a consequence we are forced to picture the future lot of the common people as becoming continually worse, for an increase of misery is consequent to the genesis of ever multiplying wants that cannot be satisfied.

Notwithstanding the large measure of truth in

the foregoing statements, there is warrant in believing in the possibility of progress.

First, the more advanced a society becomes the greater is its ability to settle on a goal which it desires to realize. It is quite likely that this national society will emphasize one set of attainments, and that one another set. There can be little question that the German nation has accepted and realized most successfully a certain national ideal and that this fact differentiates it from other nations. A widespread intelligence as to social conditions in general is the foundation of an agreement on the ideal to be realized, and a sympathetic understanding is the essential to the universal acceptance of a systematic plan for its attainment.

Second, an intelligent interpretation of the course of human development results in the belief that the lot of the masses of people has undergone improvement. For note what is expressed and involved in these successive stages of social evolution: cannibalism, slavery, serfdom, free labor, the right of property, and civil and political rights. The terms of this series represent the condition of the mass of people at the successive stages of societal development, and the series indicates a tremendous and consistent, if slow, advance in the enjoyment of personal liberty, property rights, and the larger satisfactions of life. While the great majority of men

today have many wants they cannot satisfy, yet, except for a small minority, many desires besides the more necessitous ones are realized. And while considerable sections of our populations actually face want in the midst of plenty, it is doubtful if those populations would be willing to exchange their condition for those of the slaves and serfs of previous ages. And this is the more true because present normal individuals possess a foundation of hope that they may be able to work an improvement in their lot while the slave and serf possessed no basis for such optimism.

Third, a consideration of the development of the agencies of social control by the masses, together with that of the sociology of control, warrants the belief that it is possible to improve the lot of the average man and ultimately to abolish from society the major portion of misery. If it is a fact that the conditions of the masses have improved during the centuries, it is also a fact that the gains have come because those masses have taken over more and more of societal direction and have attained a greater appreciation of their place in the social system. A study of the evolution of the state indicates that that institution has developed away from being a mere agent of exploitation in the hand of a ruling class and towards becoming the means by which a whole people regulates its common life. And

although the process is still incomplete it is a hopefully continuing process.

Likewise the sociology of control demonstrates that society is a field of forces and conditions which may be studied and understood. Because they may be understood, as is the case with natural forces whose characteristics are known, they can be harnessed, regulated, and directed. Hence the conclusion arises that a people may successfully coördinate and direct the forces and conditions of its life by promoting a universal insight in the societal realm. But it is essential to recognize that a knowledge of the appropriate means to attain societal ends and a general desire to realize them are as imperatively demanded as knowledge.

Conditions of Progress

Since the nature of progress is not identical with that of evolution, it would be expected that the conditions which favor the former may not correspond to those which were seen to determine evolution. In so far as evolution consists of an adaptation of society to nature in such manner that the well-being of the members of society is promoted, the conditions which account for such an adaptation are also conditions of progress. Thus it was necessary for the United States government to systematize sanitation in the Panama zone as a precondition to construct-

ing the Panama canal. This doubtless was an evolutionary step, as it was one of progress. But there are some special factors or conditions which must exist in order that progress may take place steadily and extensively.

One condition is the existence of intelligence. More than any other agency intelligence begets progress. Custom-bound and backward-looking minds bind society to a treadmill of repetition. Improvement does not arise when what obtains is regarded as so sacred that it may not be readjusted. Reason studies conditions and perceives that evils arise because conditions are unfavorable and that they may be eliminated by a process of modification. It invents, devises, organizes, and transforms. A few such minds in a community may induce favorable action. Multiply the number of rational minds and beneficial actions are increased. Raise the intelligence of all the minds of the group, and advantageous ways to secure results are sought by all. Progress is advanced to the degree minds are rationalized and in the measure of the universality of intelligence among the people. Continuous progress is dependent on the steady elevation of intelligence among a citizenship at large.

Along with a greater development of intelligence must go an increased altruism. Intelligence left to itself may work individualistically

and selfishly. Not all inventive minds are considerate of the welfare of others in the effects which their inventions produce. It is possible to promote an organization which secures a greater efficiency in its particular processes but which, at the same time, is capable of being used to benefit a few and injure the many. Since society is a gigantic coöperative association in which every citizen has vested rights all agencies must be used for the common good. A large sympathy with other men and an insight into the nature of society are necessary safeguards of the common life.

An additional condition of progress is the institution of an adequate means of social control. Since it has proved possible that individuals and groups may organize agencies which they use for selfish purposes to the injury of the masses of their fellow citizens, it becomes highly essential that society shall provide a means of regulation and control which shall make such results impossible. That society has perfected a complete system of such control agencies is obviously untrue, but it has made advance to the extent that initial provisions have been instituted. Since society consists of all its individual members, and all have equal vested rights to the benefits of society as a coöperative undertaking, it is obvious that regulating agencies should be under the control of the citizenship generally. If

they are to be secure in their rights and productive labor the distribution of the achievements of society can not be left to be operated by a few interested individuals or to a small class of men. If culture in its best sense is "the total technique for getting things done," the promotion of civilization consists in the "popularization or democratization of the use of culture."

CHAPTER XI

THE EQUALIZATION OF OPPORTUNITY

WE have hitherto concluded that the thought of well-being lies at the very center of the conception of progress and assists in differentiating progress from evolution. In so far, therefore, as society presents a system in which the well-being of any or a large number of individuals is unnaturally restricted, the possibility of equalizing conditions among men becomes an important consideration.

Equality and Social Justice

To whatever degree equality among men is possible, its desirability must rest upon social justice. It is theoretically conceivable that equality might be possible and yet be undesirable. However, if social justice demands it there is no justification for preventing its realization. For, in part, justice is the habitual principles of human relationships men have worked out empirically and that have come to regulate those actions which have an effect on others. But the conception of social justice also involves our idea of what human relationships should be, and, as is the case with all well-founded ideals, the accom-

panying imperative which demands that the ideal shall be realized is strong.

It is well to recognize that the idea of human equality is liable to valid criticism, but there is no sanction for the extreme attack which has been directed against the positive claims made in the Declaration of Independence. The purpose of that document was not to give a precise definition and exposition of terms but to make clear and positive statements that would grip the men of the time and secure their assent. Furthermore, Jefferson's assertions contain more truth than the statements of the opponents of human rights. Were the attacks made against the conception of equality well-motivated and intended to advance social well-being, such criticisms would be valuable; but too often they are thinly veiled attempts to disparage aspirations toward democracy and to promote a system of inequalities.

As a matter of fact, absolute equality among men is non-existent and practically impossible of realization. Only a little reflection is required to show that in respect of weight, stature, strength, appearance, and other physical characteristics men are neither born equal nor destined to develop into beings that are equal. It is almost as obvious that a profound inequality exists among individuals in their mental capacities, for native capacity grades up through a series of interme-

diate intellectual stages from the imbecile to the genius. Being congenitally unequal in capacity, the individuals can never become equal by development. Likewise it is apparent that there is a great diversity in the social conditions into which men are born. Fortune determines that some shall be born to wealth and position and that others shall inherit poverty and obscurity; and these conditions of birth have great influence in determining to what economic and social attainment the individuals shall arrive.

It is somewhat patent that if we were to base a doctrine of equality on the facts of birth and of prevalent social relationships, we would have to conclude that fate has decreed a social system in which inequalities are inherent. And perhaps we would further incline to a justification of a class system in society which would correspond to the outlines of the various congenital classes. Thus the strong and the able would form the upper classes, and the weak and the mentally deficient would constitute the lower. And could the restraints of a well-established system of relationships be overcome, no doubt human beings would be sifted out on the basis of capacity and settled in an order of social classes which would conform to their various grades of ability. Further, if the strong and the able were always well-disposed, such an arrangement would present a social order based on a large measure of

so-called natural justice. Because congenital capacity constantly determined where each individual should serve in the system, there would occur a perpetual adjustment of individuals to the social order.

Unfortunately our social system was not established on any such principle, and human beings are not regimented according to their capacities and their developed abilities. And it is quite certain that, if, suddenly, society could be arranged according to that scheme, it would not perpetuate itself according to the principle of congenital capacity so that "natural justice" would continue. For the able individuals who occupied the places of power would insist that their offspring, whatever their capacities, should retain the positions of the parents. As a consequence, the natural method of establishing the social relationships would be broken down and a system of inequalities would be established. It is quite obvious that a "natural order" would soon be wrecked on the rock of privilege.

Since men are born unequal, and since the social system tends to perpetuate such inequalities as obtain, what then does social justice require? Evidently it does not require the impossible, and proclaim that the genius and the imbecile should be considered equal. It does demand, however, that every human being should be given opportunity to develop his powers to their limits,

and that no restrictions should be allowed to prevent that development.

Removal of Artificial Restrictions

It is difficult to appreciate the operations of the minds of these who would maintain that the present social order actually realizes social justice; that every individual obtains his righteous deserts, and that there are no inequalities of opportunity. For it would appear evident, to the fair-minded man, that many such inequalities exist, and that multitudes of able and deserving men and women enjoy only a minimum of that well-being to which their gifts entitle them. To deny this is to overlook many startling facts as well as to assert that whatever happens is right. Such a position would have to maintain that the 450,000 men who were unemployed in the city of New York during the winter of 1914-15, a small part of those in the entire nation, received their just deserts. Yet the majority of those workers had been thrown out of employment in which they had shown themselves steady, intelligent, skilled, and ambitious citizens. It would have to demonstrate that social conditions have no influence on human development, and that criminals, paupers, prostitutes, and the wreck-ages of child labor invariably have determined their own destiny, in spite of any and all circumstances. Because such a position, when its le-

gitimate results are stated, reveals its own weakness it is unnecessary to devote time to its refutation.

In view of what has been said it can be stated that equality of opportunity can obtain only when, and to the degree to which, artificial social hindrances are removed. Again we are likely to be met by the assertion that many of the results that are considered artificial restrictions of opportunity are in reality the outcome of heredity, physical environment, or ethnological characteristics, none of which can be eliminated. Let us admit that those are important influences for mankind in general, but insist that their determinative effects must not be overrated. The influence of heredity has been recognized in the discussion of the idea of equality. It doubtless differentiates the talented from the feeble-minded, and completely foreordains the position of the latter, but only partially that of the former, in society. It has been amply demonstrated by Odin, Ward, and Davies that the social environment is the important factor in deciding whether a born genius will or will not develop into an actual genius, according as it offers or withholds opportunities for development. Inheritance bestows capacity but cannot guarantee its development as ability; the social environment may prove an insuperable obstacle.

In like manner the searching work of the pub-

licists just mentioned has proved that physical locality and ethnological characteristics exercise no appreciable influence on the production of talent. Talent is likely to manifest itself irrespective of geographical situations and emerge from any racial group, providing the fit opportunities are offered by the society. And while the investigations have been directed toward discovering what conditions determine the development of talented individuals, it is most probable that their results are applicable to the masses of people. For it would appear that the conditions which favor or retard the development of the talented mind also influence correspondingly the minds of the normal individuals. If conditions are able to check potential talent, they no doubt exercise a greater hindrance over the average man.

As a result of the foregoing considerations, we may conclude that the conditions which produce the inequalities of opportunity in society, aside from the factor of heredity, are resident in the social system. We are consequently driven to believe that the dependable hope of equalizing opportunities lies in some sort of social reorganization. And, as will be observed in a subsequent place, the conditions which govern heredity may prove subject to regulation. Relative to the equalization of opportunity, then, the removal from society of what may be termed artificial

restrictions constitutes the foundation of optimism. The suggestion is of fundamental importance and, consequently, its closer scrutiny is desirable.

Direction of Equalization

What has thus far been said justifies the belief that the causes which produce inequalities of opportunity between the individuals of any given social system are to be discovered in the system itself, and not in race characteristics and the external physical environment. If this be true, the inference is inevitable that all efforts to remove inequalities must be directed toward readjusting the fundamental relations and processes which society expresses. The question as to whether or not progress is possible was raised in a previous connection, and the conclusion involved belief in its feasibility. We are now confronted by the necessity of showing what direction efforts to equalize opportunity should take. A brief allusion to the processes by which inequalities arise is required in order that the way to improvement may be seen.

The chief characteristics of the process by which inequalities eventuate are the desire of a group or class to exploit and enjoy the productive ability of other groups or classes, the actual subjugation of such groups, the formation of a system of control by the subjugating group by which

those subordinated may be continuously exploited of their productivity, and the accompanying establishment of a ruling and of a dominated class. Social scientists have demonstrated beyond peradventure that when the state arose this process accounted for its genesis. When it was established it was formed as the authoritative system by means of which the large group of producers were deprived of the fruits of their labors. The ruling class possessed the power to maintain the order it had established by force, and it further built up a system of social doctrine and sanctions, by means of the inculcation of which the subordinated group was gradually reconciled and came to view the social order as a sacred system.

While, as will be indicated in a later connection, the state has undergone a marked transformation since its establishment, it is certain that it has not lost all of its primitive characteristics. Within the social order of which it is a part, the desire of a strong class to secure the fruits of labor of other classes without adequate compensation, the control of the industrial organization through which the social product is distributed so that the producing class can be exploited, a large influence over the state, the regulative agency of society, and a somewhat successful command of the organs of publicity by which opinions relative to the fairness of the social system are founded, still measurably obtain. Due

reflection upon the facts of the distribution of wealth and incomes in the United States, of the methods which the great industrial organizations have employed to increase their profits unduly, and of the exploitive motive of business generally, will convince the candid mind that the principle of exact justice does not control the ordering of our present system.

A fundamental and adequate method of improving the present social order must begin with the attempt to secure an efficient system regulating the production and distribution of wealth. And this is placed first, not because it is thought that wealth is the most important consideration in life, but because it is the means which commands the avenues to the successful attainment of all the other great interests. It regulates the control of leisure by which access to education, culture, and the higher blessings of life are made possible. Since the state is the agency which the masses of men must depend on to safeguard their interests, they must seek to adapt that institution in such fashion that it will perform its full duty.

Since economic inequalities have to do with the distribution of wealth, attempts of the state to exercise regulative functions cannot avoid dealing with the institution of private property. The unlimited power over the channels of production and distribution of wealth cannot be left in the hands of a class. The very fact that a few

men enjoy incomes greater than that of many of our states, while millions of able and deserving men have a bare subsistence, is a great injustice and a perpetual menace to social democracy. It is the part of wisdom that the citizenship, acting through the state, shall place limits on the size of private fortunes and establish a system of taxation so graduated that all wealth and income above that limit shall return to the state.


While the regulation of the economic processes is seen to be fundamental, because wealth is the basis of realization in general, the precondition to successful regulation and to the removal of all inequalities consists in the use of the intellectual faculties. The human mind is the agent by means of which all improvements have come. This is as true of the business of society as it is of that of private individuals. In the last analysis, society moves forward to better conditions in the measure of the enlightenment of its constituent members. The condition of the masses of people cannot be improved until they are intelligent enough to see the value of changed methods of living. Nor can it be expected that permanent readjustments in the social system are to be realized before the body of citizens become intelligent about social relationships. Intelligence, of course, means information and education.

The only remedy for the inequalities of life and for the subordination of class by class is to

is inconceivable that social evolution could continue in the direction of progress under the reign of such conditions. On the contrary, we would have to expect it to flounder, halt, and eventually to become regressive.

The Situation

The socially unfit consists of those individuals who by reason of serious defects of any kind are rendered dependent for their care and support upon the efforts of others. That the extent of this class of persons is enormous is the testimony of statistics and observation. Should we enumerate the number of insane, feeble-minded, epileptics, chronic paupers, "habitual" and "instinctive" criminals, tuberculous, cancerous, blind and deaf, not to mention milder forms of deficiency, which exist in the United States, the result would have to be recorded in millions. Conceding that some of the classes may have a degree of conventionality and fluctuation, the outcome is not greatly changed. And while the question of whether or not certain kinds of these defectives are increasing faster than the population is a decidedly vital one, perhaps the more serious consideration is that such colossal deficiency exists in a "civilized" social order, and how far society and its members generally are weakened by its presence. Should we compare the present situation with our vision of the social



utopia, with our ideal society, we must be truly astounded that our civilization harbors so much waste humanity and misery.

The Origin of the Unfit.

The easy view of the origin of the unfit is that they are the products of an inscrutable Providence, perhaps created to chasten the parents or to offer due scope for the exercise of benevolence on the part of the wealthy. Quite as complacent a position is that the impoverished class is wholly the result of the volitional stupidity and inefficiency of its members. The naturalistic view regards all derelicts as the "unfit" which natural selection and the struggle for existence of a sheer biological evolutionary process are seeking to discard. The sociological position represents them as the product of societal conditions, the results being mediated or actuated by means of biological processes. The advantage of the latter position is visible in the foundation it lays for remedial action, for if such derelicts are the products of Providence or of a purely biological process they are obviously beyond the reach of human control. Besides, it is the scientific attitude because it coincides with the facts.

Most of the deficiency of humanity that collectively bulks as the unfit has an immediately biological cause. There can be no question that this is true of most feeble-mindedness, idiocy,

much of epilepsy, blindness, deafness, and certain diseases which render individuals incompetent. Researches in the field of mental deficiency have amply demonstrated that feeble-mindedness in all its forms descends from generation to generation according to well-known laws of heredity. The same is true of congenital blindness, deafness, epilepsy, certain kinds of insanity, of spontaneous cancer, and probably of other deficiencies. We may select a case within these limits and be assured that its immediate determining conditions are to be found in the parent stock. Deficiencies of a kind beget deficiencies of that kind with Mendelian regularity and certainty.

Further, it is known that some of the deficiencies that are passed on in a hereditary manner arose out of diseased conditions. This is true of some mental and physical deficiencies. Thus epilepsy, idiocy, feeble-mindedness, insanity, deafness, blindness, and so on, may be the outcome of syphilitic poison and may descend in Mendelian fashion. It could hardly fail to be the fact that, once pathological inroads have been made into the cell structures of the physical organism, the defects should be passed on from generation to generation. This does not touch the question as to whether or not acquired characteristics are transmitted.

It would be difficult to discover what proportion of human deficiencies and misery is of

immediate biological origin and what arose out of societal inequalities. But it is necessary to remember that many of the ills of body and mind have their causal conditions in the illogical and inhuman strains and deprivations which the present social system imposes. Thus the dwarfed and enfeebled workers in many cases are the products of child labor, insufficient food, and unsanitary conditions of labor and of living. The portion of human misery such societal situations produce must be, on the whole, greater than that produced by biological causes operating immediately.

Again, there are certain so-called pathological conditions of society which produce societal misfits. The presence of prostitution with its attendant venereal diseases, and of alcoholism with its well-known physical and mental ills, is illustrative. Like societal inequalities, they are conditions set up in the social system out of which come great misery and physical and mental deficiencies, some of which entail hereditary consequences.


What seems to be true is that modern men are so enveloped by the societal environment that it not only conditions their present societal state but is the fruitful and ultimate cause of the physical and mental qualities of descendants. The societal system determines under what biological conditions men shall associate and work and, con-

sequently, what they will transmit as a physical and mental heritage to their descendants.

Elimination of the Unfit

By reason of what has been sketched in the immediately preceding paragraphs we have an indication of the lines of procedure by which society may get rid of its misery, in so far as its misery is identified with the existence of the unfit classes. Since that portion of societal ills which is the product of the inequalities of the existing social order has received consideration in a separate chapter, and the methods of its abolition were there sketched, no further notice of it will be taken. Besides that, as we have seen, there are present in society the hereditary causes of the unfit, however they may have started, the vices, alcoholism, crime and dependency, not to speak of many diseases, such as tuberculosis and cancer. Tuberculosis might well be added to vice and alcoholism since it so frequently emerges from depressed classes, and consequently is a product of societal maladjustment.

First, in so far as the societal unfit are the product of hereditary factors at work in society, it is obvious that they cannot be eliminated by medical treatment nor by a let-alone policy. Since the cause is clear—inheritation—a method of preventing a recurrence in succeeding generations by means of transmission is essential, and the




only way to accomplish the result is by making reproduction impossible. This imposes the necessary task of segregating the feeble-minded of all types, the congenital epileptics of advanced form, the hereditarily insane, and "instinctive" criminals, in institutions where reproduction is rendered impossible. This is the only certain method of accomplishing the desired results. It is considered here that, in so far as dependency and crime are the products of hereditary factors, that the individuals may be detected by clear symptoms and should be included among the segregated. No doubt it is true that eugenic marriage laws and such operations as vasectomy may accomplish much, but the latter is likely to be confined to institutional practice, and the former does not prevent reproduction by extra-legal means.

Second, prostitution has been, for a long time, a quasi-societal structure, sometimes provided for by regulation and sometimes penalized by law, but always to be reckoned with as an existing fact. Its train of diseases and afflictions, therefore, have an intensely societal characteristic, the whole situation often being termed "the social evil." Since vice involves a continuous societal relationship, the method of eliminating it must involve recourse to social measures. Investigations of prostitution made by commissions created in various American cities during recent

years uniformly prescribe absolute prohibition by law as the only adequate means of combating vice, and, conversely, they agree in pronouncing the method of segregating and regulating prostitution so largely practiced in European cities a colossal failure. It is noteworthy that many of the most eminent physicians of Europe have come to the same conclusion. Vice is to be stamped out, not palliated. This will require legislation and education to accomplish, but vice entails such widespread and deadly results that the extremest measures should be approved.

Third, alcoholism also bears an institutional aspect, having been practiced so widely during the past and so uniformly abetted by governments. It is only in recent times that it has received any considerable opposition by public opinion and legislation. It is possible to be judicious and say that probably over twenty per cent of insanity, as much or more of dependency, and, perhaps, fifty per cent of crime are immediately instigated by alcoholism. It is condemned by the fact that it is the uniform associate of the worst and most vicious in human society.

As in the case of prostitution, regulations which continue its existence are palliatives of its evils and are ineffectual cures. Men have no rights that need to be regarded where the evil consequences are so disastrous to race and society as in this case. Absolute prohibition on the part



of organized society is the only effective and finally effectual method of dealing with alcoholism. To say that men will have liquor in spite of prohibitions is no greater argument against prohibition than the same form of argument is against legal prohibitions of prostitution or of other societal ills.

In neither case can prohibition be absolutely effective so long as large communities maintain flourishing institutions, protect them by law, and support governments and educational institutions with derived revenues. But every expansion of the prohibition circle renders the system more effective, and in reason, this is all that could be expected of it.

Until prohibition becomes universal, certain alleviations of intemperance must be made use of. If drunkenness is a disease and if the inebriate breeds a degenerate will adequate institutional treatment will be necessary to reclaim devitalized personalities, such as farm-colonies for inebriates, where they may be segregated and reinstated by regimen and work.

By a careful scientific observation, study and classification of the unfit and especially by the attainment of a knowledge of the conditions which produce them, it should be possible finally to eliminate that class of persons from society. That it could not be accomplished in a generation must be patent. First, our knowledge of the

causes of such individuals is by no means complete; we do not know to what extent many of their ills are immediately biological or sociological, and, as a consequence, the proper preventive measures could not be formulated. Second, we have not as yet the social mind and will with which to appreciate, favor, and adopt sufficient eliminating remedies. It will take much time under a superior system of education and publicity to breed a zealous, popular intelligence in behalf of such reforms; and with our present somewhat backward systems it will necessarily require longer. The outlook is that, as in the case of the equalization of opportunity, several generations probably must elapse before the masses are educated up to the point of adopting remedial measures, and experiments in the direction of just the right eliminative measures have been made. But society is almost incalculably old, the progress that has arisen has come about by fits and starts all through the ages, and consequently there is ground for hope of completing this gigantic task.

However, it must be anticipated that there will always be present in society, in spite of eliminations of the unfit, a best and a worst, the superior and the inferior. The abolition of inequalities and the elimination of the unfit could contemplate no more than, first, the establishment of such societal conditions that individual capac-

ity would never meet artificial obstacles of the monopolistic and class species in seeking to realize itself; and, second, that until subnormal societal members should become obsolescent, within the sphere of the normal all shadings of physical and mental capacity would be found existant.

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